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The FDA's Tobacco Regulations
I. INTRODUCTION: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN TOBACCO REGULATION
A. The FDA Regulations
On August 9, 1995, the Commissioner of the Food and Drug Administra-
tion (FDA), David Kessler, announced the agency's intention to regulate
tobacco products as delivery devices for the drug nicotine. His plan was
outlined in a set of proposed rules entitled, "Regulations Restricting the Sale
and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco Products to Protect
Children and Adolescents."' As the title indicates, the rules focused heavily
on restricting the availability and advertising of cigarettes to minors and
included the following provisions: the creation of a federal law criminalizing
the sale of cigarettes to minors;2 a requirement that tobacco companies spend
$150 million on an educational campaign to discourage young people from
smoking;3 and bans on all of the following: pictures or color print in cigarette
advertisements in magazines with a youth readership of 15% or more;4 all
billboard advertising of cigarettes within 1000 feet of schools and playgrounds,
and pictures and color print on billboards elsewhere;5 the display of tobacco
product brand logos in sports or music events sponsored by tobacco compa-
nies;6 cigarette vending machines;7 mail-ordering of tobacco products;'
cigarette brand-names on promotional items such as hats or T-shirts;9 and
"kiddie packs" containing fewer than 20 cigarettes.'"
Kessler's announcement provoked an immediate and ongoing storm of
controversy. In the commentary period that followed the issuance of the
proposed rules, the FDA received over 700,000 letters of both approval and
protest." The agency spent a year reviewing comments and revising its
1. 60 Fed. Reg. 41,314 (proposed Aug. 11, 1995).
2. See id. at 41,322.
3. See id. at 41,326-28.
4. See id. at 41,335-36.
5. See id. at 41,334-35.
6. See id. at 41,336-38.
7. See id. at 41,324.
8. See id. at 41,325-26.
9. See id. at 41,336.
10. See id. at 41,324-25.
11. Stephen Barr & Martha M. Hamilton, Clinton Curtails Tobacco Ads in Bid to Cut Sales to
Youth, WASH. PoST, Aug. 24, 1996, at Al.
Yale Law & Policy Review Vol. 15:399, 1996
proposals; the final rule was announced on August 23, 1996.12 There were
modest revisions in the final rule: It revokes the specific requirement of a $150
million contribution toward an educational campaign, and replaces it with a
more general requirement of cooperation in developing such a campaign; 3 it
exempts "adult" establishments from the vending machine ban; 4 and it
withdraws the proposed ban on mail-order sales. ' For the most part,
however, the final regulations are substantially similar to the proposed ones.
The rules are scheduled to take effect anywhere from six months to two years
from August 28, 1996 (the date of publication in the Federal Register),
depending on the difficulties involved in satisfying the particular provision. 16
B. Previous Regulatory Efforts
The furor over the current regulations obscures the fact that tobacco
products have long been a target of lawsuits and regulatory efforts in the
United States. 17 This history is hardly surprising, since smoking's negative
effects on health have been suspected for at least a century. 8 Attempts by
government to regulate the industry, however, have generally proven
problematic.' 9 One reason for this, of course, is the political strength of the
12. Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco Products
to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396 (1996) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. §§ 801,
803, 804, 807, 820, and 897).
13. See id. at 44,538-39.
14. See id. at 44,448-52.
15. See id. at 44,459.
16. See id. at 44,542.
17. For an exhaustive history of "Big Tobacco" in the United States, see RICHARD KLUGER, ASHES
TO ASHES: AMERICA'S HUNDRED-YEAR CIGARETTE WAR, THE PUBLIC HEALTH, AND THE UNABASHED
TRIUMPH OF PHILIP MORRIS (1996). For a briefer history that concentrates on litigation against tobacco
companies, see Robert L. Rabin, A Sociolegal History ofthe Tobacco Tort Litigation, 44 STAN. L. REV.
853 (1992).
18. Luther Burbank, an American botanist, announced in the early 1900s that smoking was
.nothing more or less than a slow, but sure, form of lingering suicide." The Tobacco Wars, MOTHER
JONES, May/June 1996, at 40 (citing KLUGER, supra note 17). Epidemiological studies published in the
1950s offered confirmation that smoking presented major health risks. See, e.g., Richard Doll & A.
Bradford Hill, A Study of the Aetiology of Carcinoma of the Lung, 2 BRIT. MED. J. 1271 (1952); Ernest
L. Wynder & Evarts A. Graham, Tobacco Smoking as a Possible Etiologic Factor in Bronchiogenic
Carcinoma: A Study of Six Hundred and Eighty-Four Proved Cases, 143 J. AM. MED. AsS'N 329
(1950). In 1964, Surgeon General Luther Terry issued a report that put an official stamp on the growing
body of scientific research. USDHEW, Smoking and Health: Report of the Advisory Committee to the
Surgeon General of the Public Health Service, Public Health Service Publication No. 1103 (1964).
19. Private lawsuits to recover damages for smoking-related illnesses have been even less
successful. See generally Rabin, supra note 17. There have been two major waves of litigation: one in
the 1950s, triggered by new scientific data on smoking's carcinogenic effects, and one in the 1980s,
probably spurred by the asbestos litigation of the 1970s. During the first period, tobacco companies
successfully argued that they themselves had been unable to foresee the health risks of smoking. See id.
at 860-61. During the second period, they prevailed by arguing that individual plaintiffs had not proven
that smoking caused their illnesses, see, e.g., Galbraith v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. SB 14417
(Cal. Super. Ct. filed Feb. 10, 1983), that smokers generally assumed any risk, see, e.g., Paugh v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 834 F. Supp. 228 (N.D. Ohio 1993) (holding that harm caused by tobacco is
common knowledge); Brisboy v. Fibreboard Corp., 418 N.W.2d 650 (Mich. 1988) (holding that risk
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"Big Tobacco" lobby in America. In 1995, the tobacco industry gave over one
million dollars directly to politicians, and "soft money" (unrestricted donations
to party organizations) totaled $2,793,496 last year.2' The industry is also
central to the economies of many tobacco-producing states.
To the extent that government has regulated the tobacco industry, the
results have been mixed at best. The main governmental initiatives were the
Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965 (FCLAA),2 1 which
required that cigarette packages and print advertisements carry health warnings,
and the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969,22 which banned
television and radio advertising. Neither provision worked wholly to the
industry's disadvantage. The health warning labels served as a shield against
tort liability;23 and when television advertising ceased, so did the anti-smoking
messages that broadcasters were previously required to air under the Fairness
Doctrine.24
Recent regulatory efforts, which have moved increasingly to the local level,
have also produced mixed results. In response to proposed local ordinances that
would seriously cut back on the marketing of tobacco products, tobacco
companies have, in some instances, pursued a strategy of anonymously backing
state anti-tobacco legislative proposals, which are considerably less harsh and
which explicitly preempt local ordinances.'
of developing lung cancer is within risk assumed by consumer), and that the Federal Cigarette Labeling
and Advertising Act (FCLAA), which mandated warning labels, preempted claims based on failure to
warn, see infra note 23; see also Hite v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 578 A.2d 417 (Pa. 1990) (failure
to warn claim preempted by FCLAA); Forster v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 437 N.W.2d 655 (Minn.
1989) (same). In both eras, a major factor in the industry's success was its remarkable "no-compromise"
litigation strategy; tobacco companies did not offer to settle in a single case, and they exhausted the
plaintiffs' financial resources with protracted deposition and discovery, financed by a virtually unlimited
budget. See Rabin, supra note 17, at 857-59; see generally William E. Townsley & Dale K. Hanks, The
Trial Court's Responsibility to Make Cigarette Disease Litigation Affordable and Fair, 25 CAL. W. L.
REv. 275 (1989) (calling for enhanced judicial management of litigation against tobacco industry).
20. Figures are from Glenn Frankel, Tobacco Industry Switches Brands; Political Donations Shift
to Republicans After Favoring Democrats, WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 1996, at Al.
21. Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341 (1982 &
Supp. IV 1986)).
22. Pub. L. No. 91-222, § 2, 84 Stat. 89 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1982
& Supp. IV 1986)).
23. Five circuit courts had held that the FCLAA preempted state claims based on failure to warn
by the time the Supreme Court ruled definitively on the matter in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505
U.S. 504 (1992). See Pennington v. Vistron Corp., 876 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1989); Roysdon v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 849 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1988); Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620
(1st Cir. 1987); Stephen v. American Brands, Inc., 825 F.2d 312 (1 lth Cir. 1987); Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1043 (1987).
24. See infra text accompanying notes 196-199.
25. Tobacco companies succeeded in passing state preemptive anti-smoking legislation in Michigan
and Maine, and are currently backing similar measures in Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania,
Ohio, Missouri, Kansas, Nebraska, Colorado, and Arizona. Interestingly, the strategy failed in
Minnesota when a leaked memorandum publicly revealed the role of tobacco companies in supporting
the bill. See Jeanne Brokaw, The War in the States, MOTHER JONES, May/June 1996, at 56, 57.
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C. Recent Developments
The current FDA regulations, however, emerge against a new and
importantly altered backdrop.' In 1988, the Surgeon General issued a report
detailing the addictive properties of nicotine.27 The following years saw
continuing scientific confirmation of this conclusion. More dramatic were the
confessions of a few former tobacco company officials' and the leaking of
voluminous documentation 9 indicating that cigarette manufacturers withheld
internal research about the health hazards of smoking, and that they have long
known about, concealed, and capitalized on the addictive properties of nicotine.
The growing body of evidence that nicotine is physically addictive-and
that the tobacco industry knew this fact-opened up a new option for the FDA,
which may regulate products intended by their manufacturers to alter the
structure or function of the body when used.3" In 1994, the FDA began
examining whether nicotine would qualify as a drug. The 1995 proposed
regulations were the result of this inquiry.3'
26. The emphasis placed on revelations about nicotine in this and other accounts should not mislead
readers into thinking that this is the only impetus for the FDA's actions. In fact, several factors have
breathed new life into anti-tobacco efforts in the past few years. The primary factor may be the
increasing health-consciousness of our society, paired with the growing acceptance - based on the
cumulative weight of scientific evidence - that the health risks of smoking are fact, not hypothesis. See,
e.g., J. AM. MED. ASS'N, July 19, 1995 (issue devoted to negative health effects of smoking).
27. USDHHS, The Health Consequences of Smoking: Nicotine Addiction. A Report of the Surgeon
General, DHHS Publication No. (CDC) 88-8406 (1988).
28. The first and best known of these is Jeffrey Wigand, the former head of research at Brown &
Williamson; others followed. See Sheryl Stolberg, Defectors Helping to Crack Wall Around Tobacco
Firms, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1996, at Al.
29. A paralegal at Brown & Williamson copied over 4000 documents and sent them to Stanton A.
Glantz, a researcher and long-time tobacco foe at the Medical School of the University of California,
San Francisco. The University published an annotated compilation of the documents. See STANTON A.
GLANTZ ET AL., THE CIGARETrE PAPERS (1996).
30. For a discussion of whether tobacco products actually meet this definition, see infra Part Il.C.
31. The discovery that tobacco companies had withheld information fueled a new spurt of litigation
as well. Although Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992), held that claims based on
failure to warn were preempted,* it left open the possibility of suing for intentional fraud and
misrepresentation. Two major class actions were certified, a nation-wide suit based in Louisiana and a
state-wide suit in Florida. See Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 889 F. Supp. 904 (E.D. La. 1995);
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle, 672 So. 2d 39 (Fla. App. 3d Dist. Jan. 31, 1996). The federal
court of appeals in New Orleans decertified the Louisiana suit on May 23, 1996, on the basis that the
federal district court failed to consider how variations in state law would affect predominance and
superiority. See Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996).
Also of interest (although not directly related to the nicotine revelations) are the many lawsuits
brought by state Attorneys General, acting on behalf of the taxpayers, to recoup Medicaid expenditures
for smoking-related illnesses. Mississippi was the first state to initiate such a suit; see Mississippi Sues
Tobacco Firms, CHI. TRiB., May 24, 1994, at 15. To date, sixteen states have followed Mississippi's
example. In Florida, the legislature passed legislation specifically enabling the lawsuits, which were
otherwise preempted by existing products liability laws. FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 409.910 (Harrison Supp.
1995). In Texas, the state is proceeding under criminal racketeering charges as well. See Wendy
Benjaminson, Morales Fighting Tobacco Industry with RacketeerLaw, HOUSTON CHRON., Apr. 7, 1996,
at 1.
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D. The Response of the Tobacco Companies
Within days of the FDA's announcement, five major tobacco companies
filed a joint lawsuit to enjoin the FDA from promulgating its rules.32 Their
arguments are manifold; among issues of copyright and takings, they argue that
the FDA lacks jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products, and that the
advertising restrictions infringe on their First Amendment rights. Although the
United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina is
attempting to expedite the proceedings, most observers expect the legal battle
over these issues to be long and costly. Certainly, the tobacco industry has
shown no sign of capitulating.33 If anything, the industry has been given new
hope by Kessler's announcement of his imminent resignation.' Although the
regulations will remain in force after his departure, they will lose what many
believe to be their most ardent and effective backer.35
Nor are the tobacco companies without strategic resources. Since the
FDA's jurisdiction is over products "intended to affect" the human body, the
issue of how much the companies knew about nicotine may be material.36 If
recent developments in other tobacco-related lawsuits are any indication,
tobacco companies will try to ensure that minimal information on this question
is available to the courts. This can be done (and has been done) in two ways.
The first is by discouraging whistleblowers. In November 1995, CBS shelved
a piece on tobacco (later leaked to the press) because an insider source had
signed a nondisclosure agreement with Brown & Williamson that might open
32. Coyne Beahm, Inc. v. FDA, No. 2:95CV00591 (M.D.N.C. filed Sept. 7, 1995).
33. To date, only one tobacco company has broken ranks and settled out of court: Liggett Group,
Inc., the tobacco division of Brooke Group. The company settled with five state Attorneys General in
March of 1996. See John Schwartz, Tobacco Firm Agrees to End Lawsuits Filed by Five States: Pact
Creates Fund Based on Liggett Group's Profits, WASH. POST, Mar. 16, 1996, at A2. Liggett is the fifth
largest producer of tobacco products; even so, it controls only two percent of the market, and it has
been argued that the settlement was simply a "little-to-lose gambit by Wall Street tycoons trying to take
control of R.J. Reynolds" (the settlement included an incongruous provision that the plaintiffs, currently
suing RJR Nabisco, would not contest an RJR Nabisco breakup). Richard Kluger, A Peace Plan for the
Cigarette Wars, N.Y. TIMS, Apr. 7, 1996, § 6 (Magazine), at 28, 30; see also Marc Levinson, Smoke
and Fire: The Inside Story of Why One Cigarette Company Struck a Bargain with Opponents of Smoking,
NEWSWEEK, Mar. 25, 1996, at 38. However, many provisions of the settlement are of interest. For
example, for 25 years, Liggett will pay 2.5% of its annual pre-tax profits into a fund to be distributed
among the five original settling states; an additional 5% will be paid into a fund for states that choose
to settle in the future. Importantly, Liggett also agreed to withdraw its objections to the FDA
regulations.
34. See John Schwartz, FDA's Kessler Will Resign Early in 1997, WASH. PosT, Nov. 26, 1996,
at Al.
35. Kessler has regularly been portrayed as the driving force behind the FDA's anti-tobacco effort.
See, e.g., John Carey, The FDA's Antismoking Crusade Has the GOP Fuming: What's Behind David
Kessler's Push to Regulate Big Tobacco?, Bus. WK., July 31, 1995, at 40. But see Jay Palmer, The
Doctor Is Out: Kessler's Departure Unlikely to be Boon for Tobacco Firms, BARRON'S, Dec. 2, 1996,
at 15.
36. Whether or not this is material depends on the interpretation of "intent," an issue discussed
infra at Part BI.C.
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up the network to a breach-of-contract suit.37 Such a suit was in fact brought
by Brown & Williamson against whistleblower Jeffrey Wigand that same
month.38
The second way to minimize the information available to the courts is to
keep documents out of evidence. Tobacco companies have argued that many,
if not most, of the internal documents subpoenaed in current litigation either
fall under the attorney-client privilege or are privileged under the "attorney
work product" doctrine.39 This argument has so far been rejected, either on
public policy grounds (the public's right to know about the health hazards of
tobacco supersedes the work product rule),' on the basis of the "fraud"
exemption to the attorney product rule,4 or both.42 It is nonetheless an
argument that the tobacco companies are still vehemently making.43
Legal stonewalling, however, is not the only response that the tobacco
companies can make. There are many serious substantive concerns that tobacco
companies have raised about the FDA's regulations. Among these are the
questions of whether the FDA has jurisdiction over tobacco and tobacco
products; whether a little-discussed corollary to the rules, the FDs
announced intention to require tobacco companies' cooperation in developing
a campaign to warn young people of the dangers of smoking, unconstitutionally
compels speech and/or association; and whether the advertising restrictions
violate the protections accorded commercial speech under the First Amend-
ment. In this issue of Developments in Policy, we will examine each of these
three issues.
- Liza Goitein
II. DOES THE FDA HAVE JURISDICTION OVER NICOrINE?
Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA or the Act),'
the FDA has jurisdiction over "drugs" and "drug delivery devices," terms
which are defined in the Act.45 From the Act's passage in 1938 until August
1995, the FDA had never claimed that "drugs" included nicotine or that
"devices" included cigarettes or chewing tobacco." The expansion of these
37. See Jonathan Alter, Blowing Smoke, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 4, 1995, at 45.
38. See Brown & Williamson, Inc. v. Wigand, Civil Action No. 3:95CV-842-S (W.D. Ky. 1995).
39. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3); see also Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947) (establishing
attorney work product rule).
40. Maddox v. Williams, 855 F. Supp. 406, 414-15 (D.D.C. 1994).
41. Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81 (3d Cit. 1992).
42. Sackman v. Liggett Group, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 357 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (also holding that
documents were not in preparation for specific litigation).
43. See generally GLANTz, supra note 29, at 235-47.
44. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-395 (1994).
45. 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(g)(2), (h)(2).
46. See, e.g., Whatley, Note, The FDA v. Joe Camel: An Analysis of the FDA's Attempt to Regulate
Tobacco and Tobacco Products Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 22 J. LEGIS. 121,
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definitions was immediately challenged by five major tobacco companies, who
filed suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of North
Carolina to enjoin the FDA from promulgating the Proposed Rule.47 One of
the grounds upon which the companies sought the injunction was that the FDA
did not have jurisdiction over tobacco, since the definitions of "drug" and
"device" under the FDA's authorizing statute did not include nicotine and
tobacco products.48
A. Standard of Review
An initial question exists over what test a court should use to examine this
issue. The standard a court uses to review an agency's interpretation of its
statute was laid down in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc."9 The Supreme Court set out a two-part test to review an
agency's construction of a particular statute:
First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for
the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed
intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly
addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own
construction of the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administra-
tive interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the
specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based
on a permissible construction of the statute. 0
This deferential standard would allow the FDA leeway, but it is not clear
that it is the proper approach. Commentators have debated whether Chevron
should apply to agency interpretations of their jurisdiction, as opposed to
interpretations of other statutes.5
121 (1996).
47. Coyne Beahm, Inc. v. FDA, No. 2:95CV00591 (M.D.N.C. filed Sept. 7, 1995). This suit had
been on hold pending final issue of the new rules.
48. Hereinafter, unless otherwise stated, "nicotine" will also refer to cigarettes and smokeless
chewing tobacco.
49. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
50. Id. at 842-43 (footnotes omitted).
51. Compare Quincy M. Crawford, Comment, Chevron Deference to Agency Interpretations that
Delimit the Scope of the Agency's Jurisdiction, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 957 (1994) (arguing that courts
should apply Chevron to agency interpretations of their jurisdiction), with Cass R. Sunstein, Law and
Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 2071, 2097-101 (1990). Sunstein argues against
deference in those cases in which "the issue is whether the agency's authority extends to a broad area
of regulation, or to a large category of cases." Id. at 2100. The FDA's regulation of nicotine would
seem to be just such a move.
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) also requires that agency actions "in excess of statutory
jurisdiction, authority, or limitation" be held unlawful. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994). However, it is unclear
how much deference should be accorded under the APA. Obviously, if a court found that an agency
exceeded its jurisdiction, it would be unlawful; but how the court conducts this inquiry is not answered
by the APA.
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The Supreme Court has not spoken dispositively on this question. Some
Justices have argued that the distinction between jurisdictional and nonjurisdic-
tional interpretations is untenable-simply by interpreting its own statute in a
certain manner, an agency can expand or reduce its jurisdiction 52-and has not
been used by the Court.53 Other Justices have claimed that this differentiation
is critical.54 Thus, although this Part will use the Chevron framework to
examine the question of the FDA's jurisdiction, its applicability in this context
has not been definitively established. If Chevron deference is not appropriate,
courts will still want to examine most of the factors that are examined herein,
but would ultimately look at the FDA's action in a much less favorable light.
Even within the Chevron framework, a number of complicated questions
exist about its application. Under Chevron, a court must first address the issue
of explicit congressional intent. This examination is done using "traditional
tools of statutory construction."" The "starting point is the language of the
statute,"56 but "in expounding a statute, [a court] must not be guided by a
single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the
whole law, and to its object and policy. "" If the language itself does not
52. See Sunstein, supra note 51, at 2100.
53. See Dole v. United Steelworkers of America, 494 U.S. 26, 54-55 (1990) (White, J., dissenting)
("Chevron itself and several of our cases decided since Chevron have deferred to agencies'
determinations of matters that affect their own statutory jurisdiction. The application of Chevron
principles cannot be avoided on this basis." (citations omitted)); Mississippi Power & Light Co. v.
Mississippi, 487 U.S. 354, 377 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring). Scalia argues that deference is necessary
in a jurisdictional inquiry as well:
[Ilt is plain that giving deference to an administrative interpretation of its statutory jurisdiction is
both necessary and appropriate. It is necessary because there is no discernible line between an
agency's exceeding its authority and an agency's exceeding authorized application of its authority.
To exceed authorized application is to exceed authority. Virtually any administrative action can be
characterized as either the one or the other, depending upon how generally one wishes to describe
the "authority." And deference is appropriate because it is consistent with the general rationale for
deference: Congress would naturally expect that the agency would be responsible, within broad
limits, for resolving ambiguities in its statutory authority or jurisdiction.
Id. at 381-82 (citations omitted).
54. See Mississippi Power & Light, 487 U.S. at 383 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall
and Blackmun, JJ.). These Justices argue,
[S]tatutes confining an agency's jurisdiction do not reflect conflicts between policies that have been
committed to the agency's care, but rather reflect policies in favor of limiting the agency's
jurisdiction that, by definition, have not been entrusted to the agency and that may indeed conflict
not only with the statutory policies the agency has been charged with advancing but also with the
agency's institutional interests in expanding its own power.. . . [W]e cannot presume that Congress
implicitly intended an agency to fill "gaps" in a statute confining the agency's jurisdiction since by
its nature such a statute manifests an unwillingness to give the agency the freedom to define the
scope of its own power.
Id. at 387 (citations omitted). See also Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 650 (1990)
("Although agency determinations within the scope of delegated authority are entitled to deference, it
is fundamental 'that an agency may not bootstrap itself into an area in which it has no jurisdiction.'"
(quoting Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 745 (1973))).
55. Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 (1987).
56. Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 5 (1985).
57. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 51 (1987) (quoting Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S.
36 (1986)) (quoting Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentine, 477 U.S. 207, 221 (1986)). See also Dole,
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clearly evidence intent, the other available tool is legislative history.5"
However, in order for the examination to end at the first Chevron prong, this
intent must be "unambiguously expressed." 59 If a court does not find such
intent, it must examine whether the agency's interpretation is a "reasonable
one."6° Such a standard gives an agency broad discretion to determine its own
policy in the absence of explicit congressional intent.6'
In this examination of the FDA's jurisdiction over nicotine, two overlap-
ping questions are discussed: (1) whether the FDA's jurisdiction over nicotine
has been addressed by the 1938 Act and (2) whether the meaning of "intended
to affect" 62 in the Act can encompass the behavior of cigarette manufacturers.
The examinations of these questions employ similar methods of analysis, i.e.,
Chevron and its progeny.
B. The FDCA, Congress, and Nicotine
Nothing in the language of the FDCA speaks directly to the question of
jurisdiction over nicotine. However, the absence of a positive declaration does
not indicate whether FDA action is permitted or precluded.63 Evidence exists
on both sides of this issue. The definitions used in the Act provide for an
extremely broad reading of the FDA's jurisdiction, and courts have recognized
this fact. However, Congress and the FDA alike have indicated in the past that
jurisdiction over nicotine was lacking.
494 U.S. at 35 (applying Pilot Life standard); Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 115 (1989)
(same). But see Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 452 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) ("[If] the
language of a statute is clear, that language must be given effect-at least in the absence of a patent
absurdity." (citations omitted)).
58. See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 449.
59. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. See Board of Governors v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361,
368 (1986) (finding that Federal Reserve Board's expanded definition of "banks" contradicted "clearly
expressed intent of Congress").
60. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845.
61. This flexibility is something the Court deemed to be important: "We have long recognized that
considerable weight should be accorded to an executive department's construction of a statutory scheme
it is entrusted to administer, and the principle of deference to administrative interpretations 'has been
consistently followed by this Court. . " Id. at 844 (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374
(1961)).
How much deference Chevron actually provides agencies has been a topic of significant debate.
Some have viewed it as greatly expanding administrative authority, see, e.g., Harold H. Bruff,
Legislative Formality, Administrative Rationality, 63 TEx. L. REv. 207, 224-25 (1984); Kenneth W.
Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 283-84 (1986), while others
have questioned whether it made a strong break with previous jurisprudence, see, e.g., Bloomberg,
Note, The Chevron Legacy: Young v. Community Nutrition Institute Compounds the Confusion, 73
CORNELL L. REv. 113, 118.
62. 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(C) (1994). For a more complete excerpt of the statute, see infra text
accompanying notes 64 & 65.
63. Had Congress desired to preclude FDA jurisdiction, it could easily have done so by explicitly
barring the FDA from exercising it. This technique has been used by Congress in other situations. See,
e.g., Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § l(a)(3) (1994) (defining areas where Commodity Futures
Trading Commission has jurisdiction to include numerous products and "all other goods and articles,
except onions." (emphasis added)).
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1. Evidence that Congressional Intent Does Not Preclude the FDA from
Regulating Nicotine
The FDCA defines the term "drug" as "articles (other than food) intended
to affect the structure or any function of the body of man or other animals"'
and the term "device" as "an instrument, apparatus, implement, machine,
contrivance, implant, in vitro reagent, or other similar or related article,
including any component, part, or accessory, which is .. . (3) intended to
affect the structure or any function of the body of man or other animals."'
The scope of this language makes it difficult to determine what Congress was
precluding the FDA from regulating, and, at least on a cursory examination,
nicotine and tobacco products would appear to fit under these definitions.
When Congress passed the FDCA in 1938, it sought to expand the
jurisdictional authority of the FDAs predecessor, the Bureau of Chemistry in
the Department of Agriculture. The Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906 defined
drugs as "all medicines and preparations recognized in the United States
Pharmacopoeia or National Formulary for internal or external use, and any
substance or mixture of substances intended to be used for the cure, mitigation,
or prevention of disease of either man or other animals."' By abandoning its
reliance on the medical profession's definitions, Congress indicated its desire
for enlarged jurisdiction.
Courts have interpreted the more open-ended definitions of the FDCA in
extremely broad terms. As the Supreme Court explained:
Congress fully intended that the Act's coverage be as broad as its literal language
indicates-and equally clearly, broader than any strict medical definition might
otherwise allow ... [W]e are all the more convinced that we must give effect to
congressional intent in view of the well-accepted principle that remedial legislation
such as the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act is to be given a liberal construction
consistent with the Act's overriding purpose to protect the public health .... I
Following this logic, the language should encompass nicotine; the FDA is
certainly acting in a manner that it believes will protect the public health.'
64. 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(C).
65. 21 U.S.C. § 321(h), (h)(3). The discussion throughout this section will be on whether the FDA
can regulate nicotine as a drug. However, whatever the answer is, the result will be the same for
whether it can regulate tobacco products as nicotine delivery devices. This is because congressional
intent and the meaning of "intended to affect" should be identical for both provisions of the FDCA.
66. Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768, 769.
67. United States v. An Article of Drug ... Bacto-Unidisk ..., 394 U.S. 784, 798 (1969)
(holding that FDA had jurisdiction over antibiotic sensitivity disk, which is laboratory aid, as drug).
68. It is not for courts to question whether the FDA is correct in believing that its policies will, in
fact, benefit the public health. As the Court stated in Chevron, "[s]uch policy arguments are more
properly addressed to legislators or administrators, not to judges." 467 U.S. at 864 (footnote omitted).
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The FDA argues further that Congress's original intent actually encom-
passed nicotine in an indirect manner. One type of item that Congress was
particularly concerned about regulating was weight management products. 69
Accordingly, one claim the FDA makes in support of jurisdiction is that
nicotine is widely believed to regulate weight gain in smokers.70 The view
that smokers use cigarettes either to lose weight or to prevent weight gain
could place nicotine into a traditional area of FDA control. However, the
question remains whether the Act meant to include those products that were not
explicitly advertised as regulating weight gain.71
The FDA proposes an additional justification for regulation: the increase
in knowledge about nicotine since 1938. At the time the Act was passed, the
medical effects of nicotine were, at best, unclear. Since then, organizations
such as the American Medical Association and World Health Organization have
reported studies demonstrating the addictiveness of nicotine, 72 and in 1988 the
Surgeon General issued a report declaring that nicotine is addictive.73
Arguably, this new knowledge moves nicotine into the general area of
regulation intended by Congress in 1938, even if Congress did not at that time
recognize that nicotine fell within its purview. Chevron's deferential standard
would allow such a reading as long as it was found that Congress's intent did
not preclude the exercising of jurisdiction.
2. Evidence that Congressional Intent Precludes the FDA from
Regulating Nicotine
At the same time, evidence exists that Congress did not intend for the FDA
to possess jurisdiction over nicotine, and, at least until 1995, both Congress
and the FDA believed that jurisdiction was lacking. Under the old Bureau of
Chemistry, nicotine would not have fallen under the definition of a drug. In
fact, the Bureau specifically stated that "tobacco and its preparation which are
69. See H.R. REP. No. 75-2139 at 3 (1938). See also Action on Smoking and Health v. Harris,
655 F.2d 236, 238 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("The limited scope of [the 1906] definition made it difficult to
control such substances as... fraudulent remedies for obesity.").
70. See Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco
Products to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,743-44 (1996) [hereinafter
Rule].
71. For further discussion on the issue of whether a product is "intended" to have an effect only
if advertised as such, see infra Section C.
72. See WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, THE ICD-10 CLASSIFICATION OF MENTAL AND
BEHAVIORAL DISORDERs 72 (1992); American Medical Association, Ethyl Alcohol and Nicotine as
Addictive Drugs, in 1993 AMA POLICY COMPENDIUM 35 (1993); see also Rule, 61 Fed. Reg. at
44,701-06 (detailing evidence regarding nicotine's effects).
73. USDHHS, The Health Consequences of Smoking: Nicotine Addiction. A Report of the Surgeon
General, DHHS Publication No. (CDC) 88-8406 (1988).
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not so labeled and are used for smoking or chewing or as snuff and not for
medical purposes are not subject to the provision of the [1906] act." 74
Moreover, the position that jurisdiction over nicotine does not exist has
been repeatedly stated to Congress by the FDA itself.75 For example, in 1972,
FDA Commissioner Charles Edwards stated to Congress that "the regulation
of cigarettes is to be the domain of Congress ... [and] labeling or banning
cigarettes is a step that can be taken only by the Congress. Any such move by
the FDA would be inconsistent with congressional intent." 76 Congress also
acted as if jurisdiction did not exist, as evidenced by repeated initiatives to give
the FDA such authority. Bills were introduced in 1956,77 1963,78 1964,79
1977, °  1978,81 1979,82 1987,83 1989,84 1992,85 and 19936 to provide
the FDA with jurisdiction over tobacco; none of them passed. These bills seem
to indicate Congress's belief that positive action was required to provide the
FDA with the authority to regulate tobacco. In other words, the 1938 Act had
failed to provide it.7
However, neither the statements of the FDA nor congressional attempts to
provide jurisdiction can be seen as dispositive. Agencies can change their
interpretation of a law, and, unless congressional intent is clearly to the
contrary, may do so if the new interpretation is still a rational one and the
74. Bureau of Chemistry, Service and Regulatory Announcements, No. 13 (1914). Of course, this
statement raises two separate issues: first, whether the nicotine in tobacco is actually used for a
medicinal purpose, and second, whether such a purpose can legitimately be attributed when the product
is not labeled to that effect. The first question is answered in the affirmative by the FDA, which cites
the use of nicotine to fulfill an addiction and to prevent weight gain. See Regulations Restricting the Sale
and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco Products to Protect Children and Adolescents,
60 Fed. Reg. 41,314, 41,453 (proposed Aug. 11, 1995). The second question is discussed below. See
infra Section C.
75. See, e.g., Action on Smoking & Health v. Harris, 655 F.2d 236, 241 (D.C. Cir. 1980);
Whatley, supra note 46, at 122-23.
76. Public Health Cigarette Amendments of 1971: Hearings on S. 1454 Before the Consumer
Subcomm. of the Senate Comm., 92d Cong. 239, at 245-46 (1972).
77. H.R. 11280, 84th Cong. (1956).
78. H.R. 5973, 88th Cong. (1963); S. 1682, 88th Cong. (1963).
79. H.R. 2248, 89th Cong. (1965).
80. H.R. 2419, 95th Cong. (1977); H.R. 3879,95th Cong. (1977); H.R. 7168,95th Cong. (1977).
81. S. 3317, 95th Cong. (1978).
82. H.R. 279, 96th Cong. (1979).
83. H.R. 3294, 100th Cong. (1987).
84. H.R. 194, 101st Cong. (1989); S. 769, 101st Cong. (1989).
85. H.R. 4350, 103d Cong. (1992); S. 2298, 103d Cong. (1992).
86. H.R. 2147, 104th Cong. (1993); S. 672, 104th Cong. (1993).
87. In 1975 the D.C. District Court ruled that the FDA had jurisdiction over tobacco under the
Federal Hazardous Substances Act (FHSA). American Public Health Association v. Consumer Product
Safety Commission, C.A. No. 74-1222 (D.D.C. Apr. 23, 1975), vacated as moot, No. 75-1863 (D.C.
Cir. June 15, 1976). Congress immediately reported bills that eliminated jurisdiction under the FHSA.
S. REP. No. 94-261 (1975); H.R. REP. No. 94-325 (1975). These bills became part of the Consumer
Product Safety Improvements Act. 90 Stat. 503 (1976). Although this law does not deal with jurisdiction
under the 1938 Act, it does provide some indication of Congress's view about FDA jurisdiction over
nicotine.
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change is "amply justified . . . with a 'reasoned analysis.' "88 Nevertheless,
less deference is accorded to an agency that propounds inconsistent posi-
tions.8 9
Furthermore, subsequent congressional behavior does not clearly prove
what the intent of the 1938 Act was. In large part, the congressional initiatives
to grant jurisdictional authority were a response to the failure of the FDA to
act.' The converse situation, in fact, has occurred with current congressional
bills that attempt to strip the FDA of jurisdiction.9' Certainly the sponsors of
these bills would not support the assertion that the bills indicate that jurisdiction
currently exists. Thus, while attempted legislation subsequent to the 1938 Act
provides some evidence as to the intent of Congress, it is by no means
dispositive in either direction.
C. The Meaning of "Intended to Affect"
The previous Section examined whether Congress had a clear desire
regarding the regulation of nicotine by the FDA. Without this "unambiguously
expressed intent,"' it would appear that the open-ended language of the
statute would permit the FDA to reasonably interpret its mandate to include
nicotine regulation. However, those opposed to regulation have a secondary
argument which focuses on a particular clause in the definition of drug.
According to the Act, a drug is a substance "intended to affect the structure
or any function of the body of man. " " Even if Congress is silent on the
specific question of nicotine regulation, if "intent" has a certain, narrow
meaning, regulation is precluded. The FDA argues that the Act's language does
not refer to explicit (i.e., claimed) intent but rather objective intent (as
explained below). Those opposed to tobacco regulation, on the other hand,
claim that Congress wanted the language to refer to manufacturers' explicit
88. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 187 (1991) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n., Inc. v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983)). See also Chevron, 467 U.S. at 862 (rejecting
argument that agency's interpretation "is not entitled to deference because it represents a sharp break
with prior interpretations"); Action on Smoking and Health v. Harris, 655 F.2d 236, 242 n.lO (D.C.
Cir. 1980) ("Nothing in this opinion should suggest that the Administration is irrevocably bound by any
long-standing interpretation and representation thereof to the legislative branch. An administrative
agency is clearly free to revise its interpretations. . . . Should an agency depart from its prior
interpretations, however, it must provide a reasoned explanation for its action.").
89. See Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402, 417 (1993) ("TIhe consistency of an
agency's position is a factor in assessing the weight that position is due."); see also Immigration and
Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 n.30 ("An agency interpretation of a
relevant position which conflicts with the agency's earlier interpretation is 'entitled to considerably less
deference' than a consistently held agency view." (quoting Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 273 (1981))).
90. See Whatley, supra note 46, at 122-23.
91. See, e.g., H.R. 2414, 104th Cong. (1995); S. 1262, 104th Cong. (1995); S. 1295, 104th Cong.
(1995).
92. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
93. 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(c) (1994) (emphasis added).
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representations. In order to determine which construction is correct (or, at
least, permissible), once again it is necessary to apply the Chevron test.
1. Intent as an Objective Standard
The FDA argues that tobacco manufacturers intend that their products have
"addictive and significant pharmacological effects" because a reasonable person
would recognize that such effects would occur.' 4 This approach moves a tort
standard into the legislative language and makes a company intend anything
that is "reasonably foreseeable." The evidence that nicotine has certain effects
on the body is fairly well substantiated,' but whether the Act permits such
a tort-style reading of intent is uncertain.
The FDA argues that this broader reading of intent is correct for two
related reasons. Both rely on the fact that the FDCA is a public welfare statute.
First, courts have generally interpreted "intent" in public welfare statutes to
mean objective intent. For example, in United States v. Focht,96 the Third
Circuit found that the language of the Federal Hazardous Substances Act
(FHSA)9 that applied to the shipping of components "intended for use in
illegal fireworks" implied an objective intent standard.9" In another case,99
a court found that rattles were a toy under the FHSA, noting that "[t]he only
rational interpretation of the word 'intended' in the statute calls for an objective
test of intent: whether a reasonable person would believe that the object is a
toy or article intended for use by children."'°° Just like the FHSA, the FDCA
is a public welfare statute, and the same meaning of "intent" should apply.
Second, courts have also given stronger and broader interpretations to other
language in regulatory public welfare statutes and, in particular, to the FDCA
itself. In criminal prosecutions under the FDCA, for example, strict liability
can be imposed.'"' Thus, when a criminal statute serves a regulatory public
welfare purpose, the mens rea requirement that is normally required for
criminal liability can be waived. Producers of pharmaceutical products, for
example, must act at their peril or face criminal sanctions. As Justice
94. See Rule, 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,690-806.
95. See id. at 44,701-39.
96. 882 F.2d 55 (3d Cir. 1989).
97. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261-1278 (1994).
98. Focht, 882 F.2d at 58. In this case, however, no question existed about whether the FHSA
covered fireworks; it explicitly did.
99. United States v. Articles of Banned Hazardous Substances... Baby Rattles, 614 F. Supp. 226
(E.D.N.Y. 1985).
100. Id. at 231. However, the court believed that Congress intended for the FHSA to require an
objective interpretation of intent. Id. at 232.
101. See, e.g., United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 670-72 (1975) (allowing for criminal
prosecution under 21 U.S.C. § 331(k) without awareness of wrongdoing); United States v. Dotterweich,
320 U.S. 277, 280-81 (1943) (same). Courts in cases such as these have differentiated between criminal
laws that punish acts that are bad in themselves, such as murder, and those that punish acts, such as the
distributing of unlabelled medication, merely for regulatory purposes.
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Frankfurter wrote: "In the interest of the larger good [the Act] puts the burden
of acting at hazard upon a person otherwise innocent but standing in
responsible relation to a public danger. " " Allowing strict liability-which
is frequently employed in tort-in this criminal situation provides support for
a tort-style intent standard for nicotine.
2. Intent as a Subjective Standard
Even though the FDA has argued in favor of an objective intent standard,
they arguably could prevail using a subjective standard as well. While objective
intent requires that manufacturers should have foreseen the result, the FDA has
presented evidence that cigarette manufacturers knew that nicotine would have
a "body-altering" effect. 3
Although cigarette manufacturers do not advertise their products as
affecting the structure and function of the human body, the companies are
nevertheless well aware of that particular property of nicotine. The tobacco
industry has conducted numerous studies that have informed it of these
addictive effects and has acted to create products that will provide the dose of
nicotine that smokers require."° Not only should tobacco companies be well
aware of the effect of their product; according to the FDA, they are extremely
well informed about this result.
3. Intent as Based on Manufacturers' Representations
The argument made by cigarette manufacturers and previously employed
by the FDA is that jurisdiction only exists when a positive representation is
made by manufacturers regarding the health effects of nicotine: "Congress has
been made repeatedly aware that the FDA cannot assert jurisdiction over
cigarettes absent health claims made by manufacturers or vendors." 5 This
is a higher standard than even the subjective test discussed above: Even if
manufacturers actually knew about nicotine's body-altering effects, jurisdiction
does not exist unless the manufacturer made representations about them.'06
During congressional hearings on legislation to expand the jurisdiction of
the Bureau of Science, the head of the Food and Drug Administration testified
before Congress that the "jurisdictional analysis would focus upon the existence
of representations made by the manufacturer."" °7 He further testified that
102. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 281.
103. See Rule, 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,854-994.
104. See id; see also Glantz, supra note 29.
105. Action on Smoking and Health v. Harris, 655 F.2d 236, 241 (D.C. Cir. 1980) [hereinafter
ASH).
106. In fact, even if the products do not have such effects, but the manufacturer claims that they
do, the FDA can exert jurisdiction.
107. ASH, 655 F.2d at 238 (citing Food, Drugs, and Cosmetics: Hearings on S. 2800 Before the
Senate Comm. on Commerce, 73d Cong. (1934)).
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jurisdiction would be lacking absent such advertising, even if a device were
used to cure certain ills. "0e
Several court decisions have restricted jurisdiction by using this representa-
tion-based reading of "intent." The case of Federal Trade Commission v.
Ligget and Myers Tobacco Co.'o9 appears to support such a reading. In that
case, the FTC attempted to regulate cigarettes as a drug. The agency made two
arguments that it claimed enabled it to exert jurisdiction. The first claim was
that the tobacco company was making actual representations in its statements
that its cigarettes were "soothing."110 The court spent little time in dismissing
this argument, and it has no application to the current FDA decision.
The FTC also argued that the cigarettes were an irritant to the body and
that this was the type of effect that allowed for jurisdiction. In finding that such
jurisdiction did not exist, the court began by observing that the FTC's
definition of "drug" is identical to the FDA's." The court then noted that
[a]nything which stimulates any of the senses may be said, in some perhaps
insignificant degree, to affect the functions of the body of man. Consequently any
article which, used in the manner anticipated by the manufacturer thereof, comes
into contact with any of the senses may be said to be an article "intended to affect
the functions of the body of man" .112
The court concluded that "the legislators did not mean to be as all-inclusive as
a literal interpretation of this clause would compel us to be."" 3 Instead, the
stated intent of the manufacturer was to serve as a limitation.
However, two factors make this analysis inapposite to the current situation.
First, a significant difference exists between the FTC's reliance on "irritation"
caused by cigarettes and the FDA's reliance on cigarettes' addictive properties.
Cigarettes do not simply irritate the body, they alter its response to other
stimuli and produce addiction. Second, the court's interpretation of the
statutory language, given its broadness, runs counter to Chevron. Since the
Chevron standard provides significant deference to agency interpretations of
their authorizing statute, and the statutory language is where the examination
of any statute begins," 4 the use of open-ended language would provide
greater leeway. Without additional information, the court's finding the very
108. See id.
109. 108 F. Supp. 573 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), aft'd, 203 F.2d 955 (2d Cir. 1953).
110. See id. at 576. The advertisement read that "Chesterfield cigarettes can be smoked by any
smoker without inducing any adverse affect upon the nose, throat and accessory organs of the smoker."
Id. at 573.
111. See id. at 576-77.
112. Id. at 576.
113. Id.
114. Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 5 (1985).
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broadness of the statute to demand a narrow reading runs counter to standard
approaches of the interpretation of agency statutes.
The only case that has specifically addressed the issue of FDA jurisdiction
over nicotine, Action on Smoking and Health v. Harris (ASH)," 5 appears to
indicate that FDA jurisdiction is lacking without actual representations of body-
altering effects on the part of the cigarette manufacturers. In arriving at this
conclusion, the D.C. Circuit relied on testimony during the 1934 hearing,
116
actions by the FDA since 1938,"' and Congress's recognition that the FDA
lacked the necessary authority."' However, this case provides limited
support, at best, for the absence of jurisdiction. Most importantly, the factual
situation was extremely different from the one at issue now. ASH was an
attempt by an anti-smoking group to force the FDA to assert jurisdiction over
nicotine. While the court's ruling rested on several grounds, the critical portion
of the decision, and one that the FDA today would not question, is the claim
that "the construction and application of a statute by those charged with its
administration is entitled to substantial deference.""' In particular, an
agency's decision not to act receives even greater deference. 20
Thus, the situation in ASH was the converse of the current one in which the
FDA is attempting to assert jurisdiction. While the D.C. Circuit provided some
evidence that congressional intent did not allow for the exercising of
jurisdiction in the absence of manufacturer representations, 121 the key
question there was whether congressional intent required the exercising of
jurisdiction over nicotine. The FDA is not now claiming that such action is
mandated but instead that a reasonable interpretation of the 1938 Act allows it
to exercise such authority. In fact, in terms both of a general claim of
jurisdiction over nicotine and of the meaning of "intent," the ASH case
provides minimal support for the anti-jurisdiction side while also supporting a
claim of deference to the interpretations of administrative agencies.
D. Conclusion
Some significant evidence exists that Congress did not desire the FDA to
obtain jurisdiction over nicotine and that "intent" was limited to actual
representations. However, if Chevron is applicable, it is unclear whether this
115. 655 F.2d 236 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
116. See id. at 238-39; see also supra note 107 and accompanying text.
117. See id. at 239-41.
118. See id. at 241-43.
119. Id. at 237.
120. See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (upholding FDA decision not to take
action against drugs used in lethal injections. "Refusals to take enforcement steps generally involve
precisely the opposite situation [from those in which specific guidelines do exist], and in that situation
we think the presumption is that judicial review is not available.").
121. SeeASH. 655 F.2d at 238-39.
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evidence demonstrates the "unambiguously expressed intent of Congress" that
Chevron requires. Once the second step of the Chevron test-examining
whether an agency has acted based on a permissible construction of the
statute-is reached, it appears unlikely that the FDA will be denied jurisdiction
over nicotine.
Of course, another factor also increases the likelihood of judicial deference
to the FDA's action-its claim that the rules protect the public health. Laws
that serve such a purpose usually receive broad readings. This reliance on a
public health purpose underlies the FDs claims that it has jurisdiction over
nicotine and that objective intent is the proper standard. Whether this one
factor is enough to answer both questions is an issue the courts must examine,
but the burden is on those opposed to regulation to demonstrate congressional
intent in order to succeed.
-Gregory S. Chernack
III. DOES THE PROPOSED EDUCATION CAMPAIGN CONSTITUTE
COMPELLED SPEECH AND/OR ASSOCIATION UNDER THE FIRST
AMENDMENT?
In its August 1995 proposed regulations, the FDA included a provision
requiring tobacco manufacturers to "establish and maintain an effective national
public educational program to discourage persons under 18 years of age from
using cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products." 22 This regulation, which
was proposed pursuant to section 520(e) of the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, 23 was not included in the agency's August 1996 final rule.
However, the FDA made clear in its comments that it does not intend to
abandon this requirement. 24 Instead of pursuing the program under its
section 520(e) regulatory authority, the FDA "intends to pursue implementation
122. Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco
Products to Protect Children and Adolescents, 60 Fed. Reg. 41,314, 41,374 (proposed Aug. 11, 1995)
[hereinafter Proposed Rule]. In establishing this requirement, the FDA sought "to combat the effects
of the pervasive and positive imagery that has for decades helped to foster a youth market for tobacco
products." Id. at 41,326. Under the requirement, tobacco manufacturers would contribute $150 million
per year to fund the educational campaign, with each contributing an amount proportionate to its share
of the total advertising and promotional expenditures of the tobacco industry.
123. Under section 520(e) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, the FDA "may by
regulation require that a device be restricted to sale, distribution, or use (A) only upon the written or
oral authorization of a practitioner licensed by law to administer or use such device, or (B) upon such
other conditions as the [Commissioner] may prescribe in such regulation, if, because of its [harmful
potential], the [Commissioner] determines that there cannot otherwise be reasonable assurance of its
safety and effectiveness." 21 U.S.C. § 360j(e) (1994) (emphasis added).
124. Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco
Products to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,538-39 (1996) [hereinafter
Rule].
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of [a national] education campaign" under the direct statutory authority of
section 518(a)."s
The FDA has not yet issued an order prescribing the scope and content of
an educational campaign, but the 1995 proposed regulations hinted at its
contours." The initiative likely will require tobacco manufacturers to
disseminate FDA-approved anti-smoking messages through prime-time
television programming targeted at youth between the ages of twelve and
seventeen. 27 Indeed, according to one report following the agency's an-
nouncement of the final rule, "the FDA will require six companies that it says
have attracted the largest percentages of underaged customers to run a cam-
paign-including television spots-that will warn children and adolescents about
the dangers of tobacco."' An FDA order of this sort clearly implicates First
Amendment protections against government-compelled speech and association.
The Supreme Court has consistently held that the First Amendment protects
"both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at
all."' 29 Recently, in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual
Group of Boston, the Court affirmed that "one important manifestation of the
principle of free speech is that one who chooses to speak may also decide
'what not to say.'"' 30 Hurley upheld the exclusion of gay, lesbian, and
bisexual Irish-Americans from a privately organized St. Patrick's Day parade,
arguing that "the communication produced by the private organizers would be
shaped by all those protected by the law who wished to join in with some
expressive demonstration of their own. But this use of the State's power
violates the fundamental rule of protection under the First Amendment, that a
speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of his own message."' 3'
125. Id. at 44,538. According to the FDA, section 518(a) gives the agency more explicit authority
than section 520(e) to compel tobacco manufacturers to fund an educational campaign. See id. Under
section 518(a), if the FDA finds that a device "presents an unreasonable risk of substantial harm to the
public health," that "notification .. . is necessary to eliminate [such] risk," and that "no more
practicable means is available ...to eliminate such risk," then the agency may issue an order "to
assure that adequate notification is provided in an appropriate form, by the persons and means best
suited under the circumstances involved, to all health professionals who prescribe or use the device and
to any other person (including manufacturers, importers, distributors, retailers, and device users) who
should properly receive such notification in order to eliminate such risk." 21 U.S.C. § 360h(a) (1994).
The FDA has indicated that "it could make the findings required by section 518(a) ... and so could
order tobacco manufacturers to notify young people about the substantial health risks that tobacco
products present in a form appropriate to eliminate the risk." Rule, 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,538.
126. See Proposed Rule, 60 Fed. Reg. at 41,327-28.
127. See id. at 41,327 ("The program would be national in scope and could require that the
companies purchase certain times and places on television programming . . ").
128. Stephen Barr & Martha M. Hamilton, Clinton Curtails Tobacco Ads in Bid to Cut Sales to
Youth, WASH. POST, Aug. 24, 1996, at Al.
129. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705,714 (1977) (invalidating New Hampshire criminal statute
requiring citizens to display motto "Live Free or Die" on state license plates); see also West Virginia
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633 (1943) (holding that school children with religious
objection to saluting flag have constitutional right to be free from "compulsion ... to declare a belief").
130. 115 S. Ct. 2338, 2347 (1995) (citation omitted).
131. Id.
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A. Compelling Corporations to Speak
In invoking this line of cases to challenge the proposed regulations, tobacco
manufacturers might find a persuasive analog in Pacific Gas & Electric v.
Public Utilities Commission (PG&E),"I in which the Court determined that
a state utilities commission violated the First Amendment rights of a privately
owned utility company by requiring it to include in its billing envelopes speech
of a third party with which it disagreed. For decades the utility had included
"political editorials, feature stories on matters of public interest, [and] tips on
energy conservation" in the extra space of its monthly billing envelope. 3a A
ratepayers' advocacy group asked the commission to forbid the utility from
using the extra space for political editorials "on the ground that the [utility's]
customers should not bear the expense of [the utility's] own political
speech."' 34 The state utilities commission responded by ordering the utility
to permit the ratepayers' advocacy group to use the extra space four times a
year, "plac[ing] no limitation on what [the group] could say in the envelope,
except that [the group] is required to state that its messages are not those of
[the utility]. " 135 In striking down the order, a plurality of four Justices held
that "[c]ompelled access like that ordered in this case both penalizes the
expression of particular points of view and forces speakers to alter their speech
to conform with an agenda they do not set."' 36
PG&E may present difficulties for an FDA-mandated educational program
in at least two ways. First, PG&E affirmed that the government has no more
authority to compel speech by corporations than it has to compel speech by
individuals: "For corporations as for individuals, the choice to speak includes
within it the choice of what not to say. . . . [S]peech does not lose its
protection because of the corporate identity of the speaker. Were the
government freely able to compel corporate speakers to propound political
messages with which they disagree, this protection would be empty . . . .
Second, the state utilities commission in PG&E was not permitted to compel
a private company to publish third party views with which it disagreed, even
where the third party was required to disclaim the company's adherence to
those views. Arguably, a mandatory educational campaign would require
tobacco manufacturers not only to fund the dissemination of anti-smoking
views, but also to identify themselves with those views. This goes one step
132. 475 U.S. 1 (1986) [hereinafter PG&E].
133. Id. at 5.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 7.
136. Id. at 9 (plurality opinion); see also Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241,
257 (1974) ("[g]overnment-enforced right of access [to press] inescapably 'dampens the vigor and limits
the variety of public debate'") (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964)).
137. PG&E, 475 U.S. at 16.
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further than the regulations struck down in PG&E. Such coercion frustrates the
"individual freedom of mind" protected by the First Amendment. 3 '
On a closer analysis, however, one might plausibly argue that PG&E does
not determine the constitutionality of the FDA's proposed educational
campaign. PG&E involved non-commercial, political speech, which receives
the highest degree of First Amendment protection. Government regulation of
such speech must be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state inter-
est.'39 It is not clear whether the content of the educational program envi-
sioned by the FDA would qualify as political speech as opposed to "commer-
cial speech," which is subject to an intermediate degree of First Amendment
scrutiny,' 4 or "government speech," which is subject to only minimal
scrutiny when its vehicle is ordinary legislation or regulation. 4' The proper
138. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943); see Abood v. Detroit
Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234-235 (1977) ("[A]t the heart of the First Amendment is the notion that
an individual should be free to believe as he will, and that in a free society one's beliefs should be
shaped by his mind and his conscience rather than coerced by the State."); see also PG&E, 475 U.S.
at 15 n.12 (state may not "require corporations to carry the messages of third parties, where the
messages themselves are biased against or are expressly contrary to the corporation's views"); Central
Ill. Light Co. v. Citizens Utility Bd., 827 F.2d 1169, 1173 (1987) ("companies can[not] be made into
involuntary solicitors for their ideological opponents").
139. See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n,'447 U.S. 530, 540 (1980)
(setting forth narrow tailoring/compelling state interest test); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435
U.S. 765, 786 (1978) (same).
140. See infra Part IV (discussing definition and standard of review applicable to commercial
speech set forth in Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980)).
141. The term "government speech" is applied to a wide array of government-sanctioned,
government-funded, and government-mandated speech. See generally Steven Shiffrin, Government
Speech, 27 UCLA L. REV. 565 (1980); Mark G. Yudof, When Governments Speak: Toward a Theory
of Government Expression and the First Amendment, 57 TEx. L. REV. 863 (1979). Here, "government
speech" will refer to expressive activities undertaken by the government in the course of furthering a
public policy goal-for example, "warning of the dangers of cigarette smoking or drug use, praising a
career in the armed services, or offering methods for AIDS prevention." United States v. Frame, 885
F.2d 1119, 1131 (3d Cir. 1989). Government speech of this sort is typically funded by general tax
revenues and implemented through ordinary legislation or regulation. It need not implicate the free
speech rights of taxpayers compelled to support the government any more than other government
expenditures for programs with which taxpayers may disagree. See infra text accompanying notes 144-
146.
While the government clearly may use public funds to pursue policies that run counter to the views
of some or many citizens, it may not compel adherence by individuals to a particular view. This
limitation on government speech is stated in Barnette: "[N]o official, high or petty, can prescribe what
shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to
confess by word or act their faith therein." 319 U.S. at 642. See also Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S.
705, 713 (1977) (forbidding state from "requir[ing] an individual to participate in the dissemination of
an ideological message by displaying it on his private property"); Abood, 431 U.S. 209 (invalidating
state laws authorizing agreements between teachers' unions and boards of education requiring public
school teachers to pay union service charge used to advocate political views unrelated to collective
bargaining). In addition, the government may not monopolize the "marketplace of ideas," Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969), or drown out or suppress competing private
speech contrary to the government's own positions. See Linmark Ass'n v. Township of Willingboro,
431 U.S. 85, 86 (1977) (invalidating municipal ordinance prohibiting "the posting of 'FOR SALE' or
'SOLD' signs" despite municipality's objective of preventing flight of white homeowners); Police Dep't.
of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (holding prohibition of picketing, except peaceful picketing
involving labor disputes, makes impermissible distinctions between types of picketing based on content);
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standard of constitutional review depends on which type of speech is at issue.
B. Political vs. Commercial vs. Government Speech
On this question, United States v. Frame142 may be instructive. The court
in Frame examined the constitutionality of the Beef Promotion and Research
Act of 1985, enacted by Congress to strengthen the nation's lagging beef
industry. Under the Act, cattle buyers and producers were required to pay an
assessment of one dollar per head of cattle to fund a national information
campaign designed to increase beef consumption. Frame, a cattle producer,
refused to pay the assessment "because it compel[led] him to participate
administratively and financially in the promotion of a cause (an advertising
campaign 'to strengthen and preserve the position of beef and beef products in
the marketplace') and a message (the consumption of beef is 'desirable,
healthy, nutritious') with which he disagree[d]. "143
In its decision, the Third Circuit affirmed a basic principle of government
speech doctrine. It asserted that "citizens do not have the right to refuse to
support financially government programs with which they disagree, even if that
program involves expressive association."'" Citing Justice Powell's concur-
rence in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,'45 the court recognized that
"[c]ompelled support of a private association"-which the state sought to
require in PG&E, for example-
is fundamentally different from compelled support of government. Clearly, a local
school board does not need to demonstrate a compelling state interest every time
it spends a taxpayer's money in ways the taxpayer finds abhorrent. . . . [T]he
reason for permitting the government to compel the payment of taxes and to spend
money on controversial projects is that the government is representative of the
people. I
However, the court went on to conclude that the advertising campaign did
not actually fall within the realm of government speech. In contrast to imposing
general taxes for the support of public schools, the government in Frame
singled out a particular group to support its beef promotion campaign.
Recognizing this "coerced nexus between the individual and the specific
expressive activity,"' 4 7 the court concluded that the advertising campaign was
NAACP v. Hunt, 891 F.2d 1555, 1565-66 (11th Cir. 1990) (discussing restrictions on government
speech).
142. 885 F.2d 1119 (3d Cir. 1989).
143. Id. at 1129.
144. Id. at 1131.
145. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
146. Frame, 885 F.2d at 1131 (quoting Abood, 431 U.S. at 259 n.13 (Powell, J., concurring)).
147. Id. at 1132.
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"not properly characterized as 'government speech.'' 148 The court explained
that "[w]hen the government allocates money from the general tax fund to
controversial projects or expressive activities, the nexus between the message
and the individual is attenuated. In contrast, where the government requires a
publicly identified group to contribute to a fund earmarked for the dissemina-
tion of a particular message associated with that group, the government has
directly focused its coercive power for expressive purposes." 149
While arguing successfully that the advertising program was not govern-
ment speech, the defendant in Frame "concede[d] that the compelled speech at
issue here qualifies as 'commercial speech.'"' 50 One might therefore expect
the court to have applied the intermediate scrutiny of Central Hudson's four-
part standard for evaluating commercial speech regulation. 151 However, the
case was not decided on this basis. Instead, the court employed a higher
standard of review because the defendant had asserted not only a free speech
but also a free association claim. Frame alleged a violation of his First
Amendment associational rights on the ground that he "[had] no desire to
participate in [the advertising] program, disagree[d] with its message and
methods, and want[ed] no part of any association, express or implied[,] with
this government created trade association."' 52 The court in Frame, relying
on Roberts v. United States Jaycees,53 noted that the right to be free from
compelled association deserves the full protection of the First Amendment.
Thus, in the language of strict scrutiny, the court promised to "sustain the
constitutionality of the... Act only if the government can demonstrate that the
Act was adopted to serve compelling state interests, that are ideologically
neutral, and that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive
of free speech or associational freedoms." 1 4
Yet, even under this exacting standard, the court ultimately determined that
the government's interest in "preventing further decay of an already deteriorat-
ing beef industry" was sufficiently compelling,"' and that the advertising
campaign's incursion on First Amendment rights was "slight" since it was
limited to the non-political purpose of "promot[ing] the product that the
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1133. At a minimum, "commercial speech" encompasses speech that proposes a
commercial transaction (e.g., the sale of beef). See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471
U.S. 626, 637 (1985), cited in Frame, 885 F.2d at 1133.
151. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980);
see also infra Part IV (discussing four-part test).
152. Frame, 885 F.2d at 1129 (quoting appellants' answer and counterclaim).
153. 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984) (holding that state statute banning gender discrimination in public
clubs implicates members' freedom of intimate and expressive association).
154. Frame, 885 F.2d at 1134.
155. Id.
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defendant himself has chosen to market. "156 The contested provision of the
Act was therefore upheld.
Four years later, in a similar case, the Ninth Circuit applied Frame's
analytic framework to reach a different result. In Cal-Almond, Inc. v.
USDA, 157 the federal government issued an Almond Marketing Order
requiring almond handlers (1) to pay an assessment to fund a generic pro-
almond public relations program conducted by the government, or alternatively
(2) to spend a comparable amount on "creditable advertising" that met federal
regulations.' Several almond handlers claimed that the order violated their
rights to free speech and free association. In a direct analogy to Frame, the
court in Cal-Almond held that both prongs of the marketing program,
independently and in combination, implicated the almond handlers' First
Amendment rights. In selecting the proper standard of constitutional review,
the court determined that Central Hudson's intermediate scrutiny applied to the
extent that the program involved commercial speech,' 59 but that the more
stringent standard of Roberts applied to the extent that the program interfered
with freedom of association."W In contrast to Frame, where the court upheld
the beef advertising program even under the more rigorous level of review, the
court in Cal-Almond invalidated the almond marketing program under the less
exacting Central Hudson standard. 161
Although they reached different results, Frame and Cal-Almond provide
some guidance for analyzing the constitutionality of the FDA's proposed
educational campaign. Because the FDA-like the government in Frame and
Cal-Almond - would "require[] a publicly identified group to . . . dissem-
inat[e] . . . a particular message associated with that group,"162 the speech
at issue cannot constitute government speech. The FD/s regulations would
therefore be subject to something higher than the minimal level of judicial
scrutiny that government speech receives.
On the other hand, to the extent that the educational campaign conveys
information concerning the health risks of tobacco consumption, it does not
"necessarily implicate a broad range of ideological, moral, religious, economic,
156. Id. at 1136.
157. 14 F.3d 429 (9th Cir. 1993).
158. See id. at 433.
159. See id. at 436 & n.5.
160. See id. at 436 (citing Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623).
161. See id. at 437-40. In particular, the court found that, although the USDA sought to advance
a substantial government interest, it "failed to meet its burden [under Central Hudson] of showing that
the overall almond marketing program 'directly advances' its stated goals of selling more almonds and
increasing returns to producers." Id. at 439. Moreover, because the USDA did not carefully consider
advertising alternatives that imposed a lesser burden on First Amendment freedoms, the court decided
that the USDA failed to prove, as it must under Central Hudson, "that the regulations are no more
extensive than necessary to serve the interest of increasing almond sales." Id.
162. Id. at 435 (quoting Frame, 885 F.2d at 1132) (emphasis in Cal-Almond).
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and political interests"' 63 that would trigger the rigorous constitutional
protections applicable to non-commercial, political speech. The primary
purpose of the educational program is "to combat the effects of the pervasive
and positive imagery that has for decades helped to foster a youth market for
tobacco products." 64 Speech that aims to provide truthful information about
a commercial product, even if it decreases sales, could lie within the current
legal conception of commercial speech.'" Moreover, the fact that the
informational campaign would occur in a highly political context would not
alone alter its status as commercial speech. For example, the Court has held
that "advertising which 'links a product to a current public debate' is not
thereby entitled to the constitutional protection afforded noncommercial
speech. 66
However, although the educational campaign could conceivably be
characterized as commercial speech, it is nevertheless unlikely that its
constitutionality would be determined by Central Hudson's intermediate
standard. Like the cattle producers in Frame and the almond handlers in Cal-
Almond, the tobacco manufacturers here would likely allege not only a free
speech violation but also an infringement on their right to free association. The
claim would be that the educational campaign forces a tobacco company,
against its volition, to associate with the FDA and other companies in the
coordinated dissemination of a message that runs counter to its interests. It is
well-settled that "[fireedom of association. . . plainly presupposes a freedom
not to associate," 16 and a claim of compelled association would require the
FDA to show that the educational program was "adopted to serve compelling
state interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved
through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms." '6
Thus, it is probable that the educational campaign would be subject to the most
rigorous standard of constitutional review.
163. Frame, 885 F.2d at 1136.
164. Proposed Rule, 60 Fed. Reg. at 41,326.
165. As defined by the Supreme Court, commercial speech is speech that proposes a commercial
transaction. See Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 340
(1986); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978). The definition of "transaction"
is not limited to a simple sell. It is the fact of being within "the stream of commercial information"
(Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771-72 (1976)),
rather than the effect of that information on commerce, that makes speech "commercial" and therefore
deserving of certain protections and regulations.
166. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 637 n.7 (1985) (quoting Central
Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563 n.5).
167. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984).
168. Id.
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C. Application to the FDA Regulations
The key question, then, is whether the FDA program would survive such
scrutiny. An examination of Frame and Cal-Almond together cannot yield one
answer to this question, considering that the two courts reached different
results in quite similar cases. However, Frame provides helpful insights into
what factors would be taken into account by a court more sympathetic to
regulation, while Cal-Almond indicates how the analysis might proceed if
undertaken by a court more wary of regulation. The FDA's rules will likely be
examined by more than one court; since one cannot ignore the individual
court's predilections in imagining the outcome, it is helpful to see how the
FDA regulations would fare under either scenario.
Frame suggests that the regulations might survive strict scrutiny. The
government's interest in "discourag[ing] young people from using cigarettes
and smokeless tobacco products"169 may fairly be regarded to be at least as
compelling as the "primarily economic" interest advanced in Frame.17
Arguably, the FDA has demonstrated a close fit between means and ends by
offering substantial evidence that the concerted dissemination of anti-smoking
messages leads to reduced cigarette consumption. 7' Additionally, in evaluat-
ing whether "the extent of the interference here is no more than necessary to
further the government's interest," Frame determined that the Beef Promotion
Act avoids "a significant incursion on Frame's constitutional rights" insofar as
it "expressly prohibits spending for political activity" and furthers an
"ideologically neutral" purpose.'72 Similarly, the FDA's proposed education-
al campaign does not seek to enforce adherence to a particular ideology nor to
influence legislation or government policy. However, in contrast to the Beef
Promotion Act, the FDA's program aims to discourage rather than encourage
consumption of the product manufactured by the entities compelled to support
the campaign. To the extent that a mandatory educational campaign would
require the tobacco industry to promote messages opposed to its commercial
interests, a court may find the campaign's interference with First Amendment
rights to be particularly burdensome.
Moreover, the invalidation of the marketing order in Cal-Almond casts
further doubt on the constitutionality of the FDA's educational campaign.
Applying an intermediate standard of review, the court in Cal-Almond required
the USDA's marketing program to be "no more extensive than necessary to
169. Proposed Rule, 60 Fed. Reg. at 41,326.
170. Frame, 885 F.2d at 1134.
171. See Proposed Rule, 60 Fed. Reg. at 41,327-28 (discussing empirical studies).
172. Frame, 885 F.2d at 1135-37.
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serve the interest of increasing almond sales."173 Where, as here, the most
stringent constitutional review applies, the fit between means and ends must be
even tighter than what Cal-Almond required: The FDA must show that its
interest in curbing youth smoking "cannot be achieved through means
significantly less restrictive of associational freedom." 174 If the intermediate
"no more extensive than necessary" standard was problematic for USDA's
marketing order in Cal-Almond,'" then the more rigorous "least restrictive
means" test surely will be problematic for the FDA's educational campaign.
The agency may argue persuasively that an educational program is an effective
means of reducing tobacco use. However, it must also explain why such a
program must be funded and implemented by tobacco manufacturers. Indeed,
it is not clear why an alternative program conducted directly by the FDA and
funded by 'general tax revenue would not be equally effective. Such an
approach would impose few, if any, restrictions on First Amendment rights.
The FDA faces the difficult task of arguing why its proposal is necessary in
light of this and perhaps other alternatives.' 76
D. "Corrective Advertising"
Finally, the FDA cites Wrner-Lambert Co. v. FTC177 to argue for the
constitutionality of an educational campaign on a separate theory of "corrective
advertising." In Wrner-Lambert the Federal Trade Commission ordered a
mouthwash manufacturer to stop advertising that its product, Listerine,
prevented or alleviated the common cold, since that claim contradicted
scientific evidence. In addition, the order required Warner-Lambert to disclose
in future advertisements that "Listerine will not help prevent colds or sore
throats or lessen their severity." 7" In upholding the order under precedents
governing commercial speech regulation, the court determined that "corrective
advertising" was a permissible remedy where "the accumulated impact of past
173. Cal-Almond, 14 F.3d at 439 (applying Central Hudson's intermediate standard). The court
explained that "this standard is not as strict as a 'least restrictive means' test." Id. Under Central
Hudson, the fit between means and ends must be "'not necessarily perfect, but reasonable; . .. not
necessarily the best disposition but one whose scope is in proportion to the interest served; . . . not
necessarily the least restrictive means but ... a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired
objective.'" Id. (quoting Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989)).
174. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984).
175. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
176. It is important to note that reliance on existing warning label requirements would not be
considered a meaningful alternative for achieving the FDA's goal of reducing tobacco use by teenagers.
The Surgeon General's warning is not directly targeted at youth; moreover, teenage smoking has
increased, rather than decreased, during the time since warning labels were first mandated.
177. 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 950 (1978) (cited in Proposed Rule,
60 Fed. Reg. at 41,356).
178. Id. at 752.
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advertising ... necessitates disclosure in future advertising. "179 The court
explained that
under certain circumstances an advertiser may be required to make affirmative
disclosure of unfavorable facts. One such circumstance is when an advertisement
that did not contain the disclosure would be misleading.... Affirmative disclosure
has also been required when an advertisement, although not misleading if taken
alone, becomes misleading considered in light of past advertisements."s
When applied to the context of tobacco advertising, the rationale of
Wrner-Lambert conceivably could support the constitutionality of the FDA's
proposed education campaign. Evidence exists indicating that "cigarette
advertising and promotion play an important role in encouraging young people
to start smoking, to sustain their smoking habit, and to increase consump-
tion,"' and that past advertising has generated a misleading association
between tobacco use and an active, glamorous, even athletic lifestyle."ls
Throughout its comments on the 1995 proposed regulations, the FDA makes
clear that the mandatory educational program is intended to be "correc-
tive. "183
Nevertheless, the First Amendment circumscribes the scope of a corrective
remedy. In National Commission on Egg Nutrition v. FMC,11 the court
upheld an FTC order prohibiting false and misleading advertising by an egg
industry trade association whose ads denied the well-substantiated relationship
among eggs, cholesterol, and heart disease. However, it struck down a part of
the order requiring the association to include in future advertisements "the
further statement that many medical experts believe increased consumption of
dietary cholesterol, including that in eggs, may increase the risk of heart
disease. " "' The court declared that "[tihe First Amendment does not permit
a remedy broader than that which is necessary to prevent deception or correct
the effects of past deception."" s The court was careful to distinguish Wrner-
Lambert on the ground that the evidence in Egg Nutrition "does not show a
long history of deception which has so permeated the consumer mind that the
'claim was believed by consumers after the false advertising had ceased.'"' 7
179. Id. at 761 (emphasis in original).
180. Id. at 759-60.
181. Proposed Rule, 60 Fed. Reg. at 41,334.
182. See id. at 41,329-34.
183. See, e.g., id. at 41,327 (educational program "would correct and combat the effects of the
pervasive positive imagery in advertising"); id. at 41,328 (referring to "corrective educational
program").
184. 570 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1977).
185. Id. at 164.
186. Id.
187. Id. (quoting Warner-Lambert, 562 F.2d at 771).
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Thus, whether the proposed educational program will survive on a theory
of corrective advertising depends largely on the fit between the corrective
remedy and the degree to which consumers have been misled by prior
advertising. In Wrner-Lambert, where the misleading claim had persisted for
over fifty years, the order upheld by the court required the manufacturer to
maintain its corrective disclosure until it had spent an amount equal to its
average annual advertising budget (approximately $10 million). Here, in its
1995 proposed regulations, the FDA indicated that it would seek $150 million
per year from tobacco manufacturers to fund a mandatory educational
program,"' a figure that reflects roughly half the amount that would be spent
on anti-smoking advertisements under the Fairness Doctrine if that doctrine
were still in effect." 9 Notably, this figure also reflects a mere 2.4 percent of
the $6.2 billion spent by the tobacco industry on advertising, promotion, and
marketing of cigarettes and smokeless tobacco in 1993.1 90 The latter compari-
son suggests that the corrective remedy proposed by the FDA does not impose
an excessive burden, at least financially, on the tobacco industry.
Additional questions remain, however, as to whether an educational
campaign is an appropriate corrective remedy for past cigarette advertising. For
instance, it is not clear in what sense an educational campaign emphasizing the
addictiveness and health risks of youth smoking would be a "correction" for
the pervasive positive imagery of glamour and social desirability cultivated
through prior advertising. In addition, while the FDA had contemplated an
educational campaign with "major reliance on television messages,"1 9 one
might question whether anti-smoking spots on television would be a fitting
remedy given the fact that pro-smoking advertisements on television and radio
have been banned for twenty-five years."9
More fundamentally, it is arguable whether tobacco advertising has been
"misleading" in a way that would justify the imposition of a corrective
remedy. 193 In Egg Nutrition and Wrner-Lambert, private entities had made
188. See Proposed Rule, 60 Fed. Reg. at 41,328.
189. Before Congress decided to ban cigarette advertisements from television and radio (see infra
note 200 and accompanying text), the Fairness Doctrine required broadcasters to provide significant
commercial air time for anti-smoking messages. Between 1967 and 1970, "one anti-smoking message
appeared for every three or four industry-sponsored, pro-smoking advertisements," amounting to $75
million in 1970 dollars (or $290 million in 1994 dollars). See id. at 41,326-28; see also infra text
accompanying notes 196-199.
190. See id. at 41,315.
191. Id. at 41,326.
192. One response to this concern might be that pro-smoking messages have still appeared on
television to the extent that tobacco manufacturers have been prominent sponsors of televised concerts
and sporting events. See text accompanying notes 202-203. In addition, television advertising of
smokeless tobacco products, though a smaller market than cigarettes, has increased in recent years. See
id. at 41,329.
193. For a description of what constitutes misleading advertising, see infra, text accompanying
notes 231-233.
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false claims about a product in the face of solid scientific evidence; in Wrner-
Lambert such claims had appeared in advertisements for half a century. Here,
it is more difficult to identify the sense in which the imagery of glamour,
sophistication, and social desirability "mischaracterizes" cigarettes and
smoking. Certainly it is fair to say that cigarette advertising is misleading-and
that a corrective remedy is justified-to the extent that such advertising
portrays tobacco use as safe and healthful. However, the educational campaign
as proposed seeks to combat the many other dimensions of cigarette advertising
that give smoking its social and psychological appeal. In order to justify the
program's broad sweep on a theory of corrective advertising, the FDA would
face the difficult and somewhat peculiar task of showing that the tobacco
companies' non-health-related claims about cigarettes are false or misleading
and thus subject to a corrective remedy.
E. Conclusion
Invoking the direct authority of section 518(a) of the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act, the FDA has declared its intention to enlist tobacco
manufacturers in funding and implementing a nation-wide anti-smoking
educational program targeted at youth. By requiring a particular group to
engage in specific expressive activity, the program implicates First Amendment
protections against compelled speech and association.
There is no precedent on the constitutionality of a government order
requiring an industry to fund an independent publicity campaign opposed to its
own commercial interest. However, related precedents yield some important
insights. First, the compelled speech at issue here could perhaps qualify as
commercial speech. Second, the intermediate standard of constitutional review
applicable to commercial speech would nonetheless give way to a more
rigorous standard if an additional claim of compelled association is asserted.
Third, to survive the higher standard, the educational program must be the
least restrictive means of achieving a compelling government interest. While
the FDA's interest in eliminating youth smoking may be compelling, it is not
obvious that the FDA cannot further this interest in a way that burdens First
Amendment rights less than the current proposal.
Finally, the FDA might defend the educational program on a separate
theory of corrective advertising. If past cigarette advertising has in fact created
a misleading association between smoking and health, the FDA has a sound
basis for pursuing a corrective remedy. However, that hypothesis is debatable,
and the First Amendment restricts the remedy to the scope of past deception.
In defining the substance and strategy of an educational program, the FDA
must ensure a precise fit between the program and the past advertising it is
intended to correct.
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IV. DO THE FDA'S RESTRICTIONS ON ADVERTISING VIOLATE
COMMERCIAL SPEECH RIGHTS UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT?
A. History of Tobacco Advertising Regulation
The FDA has chosen to regulate tobacco primarily by regulating tobacco
advertising. This approach is not a new one. Indeed, tobacco advertising has
consistently been at the heart of attempts to regulate the industry.
In 1964, frightened by growing public concern over the health risks
associated with tobacco and the potential for litigation, the tobacco industry
attempted to regulate itself through advertising constraints. The manufacturers
of over ninety-nine percent of domestic cigarettes adopted the Cigarette
Advertising Code, 94 which prohibited any advertising that was directed
primarily to persons under twenty-one or that was located in scholastic media.
The code also mandated that cigarette advertising not represent "smoking as
essential to social prominence, distinction, success or sexual attraction. " '9'
However, this attempt at self-regulation failed. No fines for violating the code
were ever enforced, and the code ended in November, 1970, after membership
dwindled to only three cigarette manufacturers.
The government's attempt to regulate advertising, occurring soon
thereafter, was at least initially more successful. The Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) applied the "Fairness Doctrine" to tobacco advertising in
1967.1 In general, the Fairness Doctrine required radio and television
broadcasters to (1) "devote a reasonable percentage of. .. broadcast time to
the coverage of public issues" and (2) ensure that coverage was "fair in the
sense that it provides an opportunity for the presentation of contrasting points
of view."" 9 As applied to the tobacco industry, the doctrine required
broadcasters to air at least one anti-smoking message for every four cigarette
commercials."'8 The FCC justified its application of the Fairness Doctrine to
tobacco advertising by stating that:
194. See 1965 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY 535 (Mar. 26, 1965) (discussing Code).
195. Id.
196. The FCC began the gradual development of the Fairness Doctrine as early as the 1940s, as
a corollary principle to the rules on personal attack and political editorial (see 47 C.F.R. § 73.123
(1968)). In 1978, the FCC formally incorporated the principle into its rules. See Regulations of Radio
and Television Broadcasting, 43 Fed. Reg. 45,842 (1978); 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.1910-.1940 (1988).
197. Fairness Doctrine and Public Interest Standards, 39 Fed. Reg. 26,372, 26,374 pt. 15 (1974).
198. See Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969)
(discussing and upholding application of Fairness Doctrine to cigarette ads).
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The advertisements in question clearly promote the use of a particular cigarette as
attractive and enjoyable. Indeed, they understandably have no other purpose. We
believe that a station which presents such advertisements has the duty of informing
its audience of the other side of this controversial issue of public importance-that,
however enjoyable, such smoking may be a hazard to the smoker's health." '
Unsatisfied with increasing public smoking levels, however, Congress later
enacted the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, which eliminated
television and radio advertisements for cigarettes."m The removal of electron-
ic media advertising meant that tobacco companies were no longer subject to
the Fairness Doctrine. Many observers believe that the tobacco companies
actually increased their volume of sales following the ban as a direct result of
the fact that broadcasters were no longer required to air anti-smoking ads. 2"
As for the tobacco companies' own ability to promote their products on
television, it was not so much curtailed as rechanneled. Tobacco companies
began to sponsor major sporting events such as the Virginia Slims tennis
tournament and the Winston Cup autoracing events. One source estimates that
tobacco support of motor sports is approaching $200 million per year.2'e
While the electronic media ban prohibits companies from airing advertisements
during scheduled commercial breaks, tobacco product logos and brand names
are prominently displayed throughout the telecasts.2 3
After the elimination of direct tobacco advertisements on television, the
government implemented additional regulations designed to strengthen the
warning labels on cigarette packages. 4 In 1984, the government amended
the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act to require a rotation of four
warnings. 25 The Federal Trade Commission later extended these warning to
199. 8 F.C.C.2d 381, 382 (1967).
200. Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, § 6, 84 Stat. 87, 89
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1994)). The Act prohibits tobacco companies from
advertising "cigarettes and little cigars on any medium of electronic communication subject to the
jurisdiction of the Federal Communications Commission." Id. Television and radio broadcasters
contested the FCC's ban, but the ban was upheld in Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp.
582 (D.D.C. 1971), aff'd sub nom. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Kleindienst, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972).
201. See, e.g., Mark R. Ludwikowski, Proposed Government Regulation of Tobacco Advertising
Uses Teens to Disguise First Amendment Violations, 4 COMM. LAW CONSPEcTUs 105, 106 (1996).
202. See Andrew Gottesman, Tobacco and Sports: One Last Breath?, Cmi. TRIB., Sept. 11, 1996,
Sports, at 1.
203. See Holly Cain, Drag Race: Clinton vs. Cigs, TAMPA TRIB., Sept. 1, 1996, Sports, at 1. Dr.
Alan Blum stated that during a 90-minute telecast of an Indy-car race in 1989, his Doctors Ought to
Care (DOC) group documented 5,933 exposures of the Marlboro logo. Gary Mihoces, Anti-Smoking
Leader Says Ban's Too Late, USA TODAY, Sept. 11, 1996, at 3C. See also Regulations Restricting the
Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco Products to Protect Children and
Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,534 (1996) (detailing comments that tobacco companies have
circumvented advertising ban).
204. Comprehensive Smoking Education Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-474, § 4(a), 98 Stat. 2200,
2201-03 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1994)).
205. The warnings are: SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Smoking Causes Lung Cancer,
Heart Disease, Emphysema, And May Complicate Pregnancy; SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING:
Quitting Smoking Now Greatly Reduces Serious Risk to Your Health; SURGEON GENERAL'S
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smokeless tobacco products and print advertising.' However, despite the
efforts of Congress, teenage use of tobacco products actually increased even
while use by adults decreased. 7
B. The Current FDA Regulations
The current FDA regulations 8 contain a variety of restrictions on
tobacco advertising. These restrictions include the following: a ban on tobacco-
product billboard ads within 1000 feet of schools and playgrounds;' a
requirement that tobacco ads in publications whose youth readership exceeds
fifteen percent contain only black-and-white text and no pictures; 21 a ban on
publicity items bearing tobacco product names and logos; 21' a ban on brand-
name sponsorship of entertainment and sporting events, including sponsorship
of individual cars and teams;21 2 and a ban on color imagery in billboard ads
except in adults-only areas such as bars and nightclubs, provided that the image
cannot be seen from the outside and cannot be removed easily.2"3 The
restrictions clearly reflect the FDA's conclusion that "the most effective way
to achieve . . . a reduction [in the use of tobacco products by children and
adolescents] is by limiting access to, and attractiveness of, cigarettes and
smokeless tobacco to young people. "214
C. First Amendment Jurisprudence on Commercial Speech
The tobacco companies, as well as numerous commentators, have argued
that the above restrictions represent an unconstitutional encroachment of their
First Amendment "commercial speech" rights. 25 The Supreme Court has
defined commercial speech as speech that proposes a commercial transaction
WARNING: Smoking By Pregnant Women May Result in Fetal Injury, Premature Birth, and Low Birth
Weight; SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Cigarette Smoke Contains Carbon Monoxide. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1333 (1994).
206. Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act of 1986 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 4401 (1986)).
207. See Elizabeth Gleick, Out of the Mouths of Babes, TIME, Aug. 21, 1995, at 33.
208. Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco
Products to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396 (1996) [hereinafter Rule].
209. See id. at 44,502 (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 897.30(b)).
210. See id. at 44,513 (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 897.32). Questions persist as to how
readership numbers will be measured.
211. See id. at 44,521 (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 897.34(a)-(b)).
212. See id. at 44,527 (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 897.34(c)).
213. However, the FDA has allowed vending machines sales in adults-only areas such as bars and
nightclubs. See id. at 44,448-52. Likewise, mail order sales of tobacco products, which the FDA had
originally sought to prohibit, are allowed under the final rule. See id. at 44,459.
214. Id. at 44,399.
215. See, e.g., Daniel Helberg, Butt Out: An Analysis of the FDA's Proposed Restrictions on
Cigarette Advertising Under the Commercial-Speech Doctrine, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1219 (1996);
Ludwikowski, supra note 201; Thomas G. Donlan, Editorial Commentary: Where There's Smoke...
Tobacco Politics Harm Health and Liberty, BARRON'S, Sept. 2, 1996, at 46.
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and is "related solely to the economic interest of the speaker and its audi-
ence."216 That the FD~s regulations curtail the tobacco industry's freedom
to engage in commercial speech is clear. Whether or not the curtailment is
unconstitutional, however, is less clear, in light of the fact that the Supreme
Court has held that the "Constitution . . . accords a lesser protection to
commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression."217
The prevailing test for the constitutionality of restrictions on commercial
speech was established in 1980 by Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v.
Public Service Commission.21 In that case, the appellant utility challenged
the constitutionality of a New York Pubic Service Commission regulation that
ordered electric utilities in the state of New York to cease all advertising of
electricity. The Court held that the Commission's complete ban of all
advertising was more extensive than necessary to further the state's interest in
energy conservation. In reversing the lower court's judgment for the
commission, the Court formulated a four-part test:
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First
Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must
concern lawful activity and must not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the
asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive
answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly advances the
governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is
necessary to serve that interest. 21 9
The four-prong Central Hudson test has guided the Court in its subsequent
commercial speech cases22 and remains the standard by which regulations
such as the FD~s must be judged. However, the recent case of 44 Liquormart
v. Rhode Island 21 may cast a new light on how the Court intends to apply
Central Hudson in the future. Liquormart involved a Rhode Island statute that
prohibited advertising of the retail prices of alcoholic beverages. In holding that
the statute failed to survive a Central Hudson inquiry, the Court invoked a
footnote within the Central Hudson decision, cautioning that "although the
special nature of commercial speech may require less than strict review of its
regulation, speech concerns arise from 'regulations that entirely suppress
commercial speech in order to pursue a non-speech-related policy.'"' 2 The
Court made a clear differentiation between narrow regulation for the purpose
216. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Conmn'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980).
217. Id. at 557.
218. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
219. Id. at 566.
220. See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995); Board of Trestees v. Fox,
492 U.S. 469 (1989).
221. 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996).
222. Id. at 1506 (quoting Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 n.9).
Vol. 15:399, 1996
Developments in Policy: The FDA's Tobacco Regulations
of consumer protection and so-called "blanket bans" meant to effectuate
government policies other than market regulation: "[W]hen a State entirely
prohibits the dissemination of truthful, nonmisleading commercial messages for
reasons unrelated to the preservation of a fair bargaining process, there is far
less reason to depart from the rigorous review that the First Amendment
generally demands."223 Liquormart also definitively rejected two commonly-
made arguments in support of commercial speech restrictions: that the Rhode
Island legislature's greater power to regulate the sale of alcoholic beverages
necessarily includes the lesser power to ban the advertising of alcoholic
beverages;" and that products associated with vice or bad habits are less
deserving of advertising protections.
225
Certainly, there are differences between the circumstances attending the
FDA regulations and the situation in Liquormart. Furthermore, no single part
of the eight-part Liquormart decision was able to garner a majority, and so its
predictive value is uncertain. It is reasonable to say, however, that the
Liquormart decision may signal an increased level of skepticism on the part of
the Court when assessing commercial speech restrictions. As we examine how
the FDXs regulations might fare under a Central Hudson test, this should
inform our analysis.
1. Speech Must Be Legal and Non-Misleading
The first prong of the Central Hudson test requires that commercial speech
must be legal and non-misleading if it is to receive First Amendment
protection. Central Hudson held that "there can be no constitutional objection
to the suppression of commercial messages that do not accurately inform the
public about lawful activity."226 However, "suppression of information
concerning the availability and price of a legally offered product is .. . a
covert attempt by the State to manipulate the choices of its citizens, not by
persuasion or direct regulation but by depriving the public of the information
needed to make a free choice. 227
While the first part of this prong-the question of whether the commercial
transaction proposed by tobacco advertising is a legal one-may at first glance
appear a foregone conclusion, the FDA argues that the activity in question is
illegal. The reasoning is that tobacco ads propose a commercial transaction and
that advertisers do not distinguish between adult and minor purchasers. Because
selling cigarettes to minors is illegal in every state, "the undifferentiated offer
223. Id. at 1507.
224. See id. at 1512; see also infra, text accompanying notes 290 & 291.
225. See id. at 1513-14; see also infra, note 266.
226. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563.
227. Id. at 574-75.
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to sell constitutes, at least in part, an unlawful offer to sell."' Consequent-
ly, the FDA claims, tobacco advertising proposes illegal transactions. The FDA
also posits that even if tobacco advertising does not propose an illegal activity,
it does encourage the "purchase, possession, or use of tobacco products by
minors."'
More rigorously contested is the second part of the first Central Hudson
prong-the question of whether tobacco advertising is misleading or deceptive.
In asserting that misleading commercial speech receives no First Amendment
protection, the Central Hudson Court further solidified a proposition from
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.:
Obviously, much commercial speech is not provably false, or even wholly false,
but only deceptive or misleading. We foresee no obstacle to a State's dealing
effectively with the problem. The First Amendment... does not prohibit the state
from insuring that the stream of commercial information flow cleanly as well as
freely.23
What constitutes deceptive or misleading speech, of course, is not easily
defined. In assessing whether advertising is deceptive for the purposes of
regulation, the FTC examines whether deception is likely among a substantial
segment of the purchasing public.23 ' "Substantial" does not imply a majority.
In the past, a court has held that misleading advertising occurred when an
estimated ten to fifteen percent of the public was misled.232 The FTC has also
taken the position, upheld on appeal, that "an advertiser's failure to disclose
material facts" may be as deceptive as openly misleading statements. 233 These
provisions make the definition of "misleading" open to a significant amount of
interpretation.
Proponents of tobacco advertising regulation argue that tobacco advertising
affirmatively misleads a substantial amount of the public through the
presentation of inaccurate images. As one commentator has written:
In the cigarette industry, advertising has actively stimulated demand for the
advertised brand by portraying cigarette smoking in general and the smoking of
advertised brands in particular as a satisfying, desirable, and attractive activity.
Such advertising has associated cigarette smoking with such positive attributes as
contentment, glamour, romance, youth, happiness, recreation, relaxation, comfort,
and sophistication, at the same time suggesting that smoking is an activity at least
228. Rule, 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,471.
229. Id.
230. 425 U.S. 748, 771-72 (1976) (footnote omitted).
231. See FTC STAFF REPORT ON THE CIGARETTE ADVERTISING INVESTIGATION 2-2 (1981).
232. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. FTC, 481 F.2d 246, 249 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1112 (1973).
233. FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 231, at 4-18 to -19 (citing Simeon Management Corp. v.
FTC, 579 F.2d 1137, 1145 (9th Cir. 1978)).
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consistent with physical health and well-being. Furthermore, cigarette advertising
has frequently intimated, without claiming outright, that smoking or smoking the
advertised brand is innocuous or at least less hazardous than smoking other brands.
Cigarette advertising has thus stressed the claim satisfactions of smoking while
ignoring completely-or even attempting to negate-the dangers of the habit.'
The defenses available to counter this accusation are twofold: the images
presented are not inaccurate, and/or they are not likely to mislead a substantial
segment of the population. Whether or not tobacco advertisements make
something tantamount to affirmative assertions of smoking's healthfulness or
innocuousness is arguable; but the same issue could be dealt with effectively
by the claim that the advertisements withhold material negative information.
The issue then becomes whether or not a substantial amount of the public is
deceived into ignorance of smoking's negative health effects. A response by
tobacco companies that may be viable is that the industry has been forced to
dispel any misunderstandings about health risks through the required warnings
on tobacco packages.235 Consequently, any potentially misleading statements
or omissions in the advertisements would be extinguished by the warnings. The
industry has pointed out that the makers of other potentially harmful products,
such as foods high in fat or sodium, do not even carry warning labels and still
have not been found deceptive in their advertising. Of course, a potent
counterargument to this is that while alcohol, sugar and other potentially
dangerous products may endanger health, they are only dangerous when
abused.236 Therefore, a person who does not receive the impression from
butter advertisements that butter is harmful is not necessarily deceived.
By far the strongest claim that tobacco advertising has withheld information
in a way that deceived a substantial amount of the public can be made
regarding to the industry's treatment of nicotine. The government made its
official pronouncement of nicotine's addictiveness in 1988, when the Surgeon
General published a full report on the subject. 7 The fact that a product can
lead to a biochemical dependence seems to fall clearly within the realm of a
"material fact," the omission of which would be seen to violate a prohibition
against deceptive or misleading advertising under the FTC's standards."s It
soon emerged, in a dramatic series of events, that tobacco companies could not
plead ignorance of this material fact. First the former head of research at
Brown & Williamson, then other tobacco company officials, came forward to
attest to their prior knowledge and exploitation of nicotine's addictiveness.
234. KENNETH M. FRIEDMAN, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE SMOKING HEALTH CONTROVERSY 102
(1965).
235. See Ludwikowski, supra note 201, at 111.
236. See SIMON CHAPMAN, PUSHING SMOKE: TOBACCO ADVERTISING AND PROMOTION 12 (1987).
237. See USDHHS, The Health Consequences of Smoking: Nicotine Addiction. A Report of the
Surgeon General, DHHS Publication No. (CDC) 88-8406 (1988).
238. See supra text accompanying notes 28 & 29.
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Later, approximately 4000 documents supporting these confessions were leaked
and published.2 39 These developments lend crucial support to claims that
tobacco companies have successfully deceived the public, since there has
arguably been inadequate public knowledge about nicotine to counteract the
industry's failure to disclose the information in its possession.
2. The Government Must Demonstrate a Substantial Interest
If the speech in question is legal and non-misleading, the government must
demonstrate a substantial interest in support of the new regulations in order to
meet the Central Hudson test for restrictions on commercial speech.2' Since
Central Hudson, the Court has traditionally found that the asserted government
interest was substantial in cases where the government was acting to safeguard
the public health and welfare.
In Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico,24'
the operator of a gambling casino in Puerto Rico sought to overturn a Puerto
Rican statute and other regulations that restricted the advertising of casino
gambling to residents of Puerto Rico. The Puerto Rican legislature wanted to
increase tourism, but believed that "[e]xcessive casino gambling among local
residents . . . would produce serious harmful effects on the health, safety and
welfare of the Puerto Rican citizens, such as the disruption of moral and
cultural patterns, the increase in local crime, the fostering of prostitution, the
development of corruption, and the infiltration of organized crime. "242 In
holding that the statute did not violate the First Amendment, the Supreme
Court had "no difficulty in concluding that the Puerto Rico Legislature's
interest in the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens constitutes a 'substan-
tial' governmental interest,"243 noting that Puerto Rico's concerns were
largely identical to those expressed by many other states in banning casino
gambling. 244
The Fifth Circuit accorded great weight to a similar governmental interest
in Dunagin v. City of Oxford.2" In that case, a group of outdoor advertisers,
newspapers, and television and radio stations brought suit alleging that
Mississippi law, which banned liquor advertising by local, in-state media,
violated their First Amendment rights. The Fifth Circuit determined, without
hesitation, that the state had an interest in "safeguarding the health, safety and
239. See supra notes 14 & 15 and accompanying text.
240. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 569.
241. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
242. Id. at 341.
243. Id.
244. See id.
245. 718 F.2d 738 (5th Cir. 1983).
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general welfare of its citizens by controlling the artificial stimulation of liquor
sales and consumption created by the advertising of liquor."246
The Supreme Court has not yet addressed the issue of the governmental
interest in protecting minors from tobacco, but a lower court has done so, and
has upheld the government's interest. In Penn Advertising of Baltimore, Inc.,
v. Baltimore (Penn II),247 a billboard owner brought suit alleging that a city
ordinance prohibiting cigarette advertising on billboards located in certain
zones of Baltimore violated his First Amendment rights. The ordinance in
question was designed to reduce the exposure of children to stimuli that would
have the effect of encouraging them to purchase cigarettes and thus to engage
in an illegal transaction.4 The court found the City's interest in reducing the
number of illegal transactions, as well as the underlying public policy interest
in reducing the consumption of cigarettes by minors, to be substantial.249
Moreover, courts are generally more likely to find a substantial interest in
regulations designed to protect children. In Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Baltimore
(Penn I),2 0 the petitioners filed an action seeking to overturn a city ordinance
that banned the billboard advertising of alcoholic beverages. While both parties
in the case agreed that the "welfare and temperance of minors" are substantial
governmental interests, the language of the court indicated that even if no
agreement existed, it was prepared to rule in the government's favor on the
issue.25'
At the Supreme Court level as well, one can find the principle that the
government has a special interest in protecting youth. To choose one example:
Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation 1 2 concerned the
determination by the FCC that the language used in a broadcast monologue was
indecent and, thus, prohibited by statute. The Court held that although the
monologue was not obscene, the language was indecent and was properly
prohibited. In doing so, the Court reinforced the government interest in the
"well-being of its youth,"" and stated that "[tihe ease with which children
may obtain access to broadcast material. . . amply justif[ies] special treatment
of indecent broadcasting. "
Against this background, an evaluation of the government's interest in
tobacco regulation appears initially to pass muster. In proposing its regulations
on tobacco, the government's stated interest is protecting children from the
246. Id. at 747.
247. 862 F. Supp. 1402 (D.Md. 1994) [hereinafter Penn IH].
248. See id. at 1406.
249. See id.
250. 855 F. Supp. 811 (D.Md. 1994) [hereinafter Penn 1].
251. See id. at 818.
252. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
253. Id. at 749.
254. Id. at 750.
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health effects of smoking. The FDA claims that the restrictions will decrease
the use of tobacco products by those who are "the most vulnerable to addiction
and perhaps the least capable of deciding whether to use the products.
Decreased use of these products will reduce the risk of tobacco-related illnesses
and deaths.""
Judging by the numbers, the government's claim appears to be legitimate.
According to the FDA, tobacco use is the single leading cause of preventable
death in the United States. 5 6 The amount of tobacco use by children is
significant; seventy-five percent of all adult smokers have reported that they
became addicted to tobacco before they were eighteen years old. 7 The
government argues that these young smokers (if they live long enough) will
become old smokers. Decreasing the demand for tobacco products will reduce
deaths and disease, which would in turn reduce the need for Medicare and
Medicaid, the budgets for which are a matter of obvious governmental
concern. 25
8
The government also has a substantial interest in preventing the sale of
tobacco products to minors, which is an illegal activity.59 All states have
statutes that prohibit the sale of cigarettes to persons under eighteen years of
age.2" Limiting the exposure of young people to advertising might reduce the
number of young people attempting to procure an illegal sale of cigarettes. The
court in Penn II accepted the significance of the governmental interest in
promoting compliance with such state statutes.26'
However, while the precedents discussed above would support the
conclusion that the government's interest in regulating tobacco advertising will
be found substantial, Liquormart sounds a cautionary note. In Part IV of the
Liquormart decision, three Justices agreed that there was much reason to be
skeptical of any governmental motives "unrelated to the preservation of a fair
bargaining process. " 262 This part of the opinion seems to suggest that the
government should only consider commercial harms. In the words of the Court,
255. Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco
Products to Protect Children and Adolescents, 60 Fed. 41,314, 41,354 (proposed Aug. 11, 1995).
256. See Rule, 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,398.
257. Figures are from Ann Toback, Philip Morris Announces New Program to Curb Youth Access
to Tobacco Products, 5 TOBACCO ON TRIAL: REPORTING ON LMGATION AND OTHER TOBACCO
CONTROL STRATEGIES 15 (1995).
258. For more on this angle of the argument, see LARRY C. WHn, MERCHANTS OF DEATH: THE
AMERICAN TOBACCO INDUSTRY 159 (1988). For a counter-argument, see Kluger, supra note 33, at 29
(pointing out that smokers die younger, thus collecting less in state benefits, and pay more in taxes than
they cost in Medicaid expenditures).
259. See Rule, 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,500.
260. See id. at 44,473.
261. See Penn II, 862 F. Supp. at 1406.
262. Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1507.
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bans that target truthful, nonmisleading commercial messages rarely protect
consumers from such [commercial] harms. Instead, such bans often serve only to
obscure an 'underlying governmental policy' that could be implemented without
regulating speech. In this way, these commercial speech bans not only hinder
consumer choice, but also impede debate over central issues of public policy.2"
Thus, even when the underlying governmental policy is one directed at the
public good, it should be viewed with skepticism. In fact, "[tihe First
Amendment directs us to be especially skeptical of regulations that seek to keep
people in the dark for what the government perceives to be their own
good." 2" Of course, the Rhode Island statute in Liquormart is distinguishable
from the FDA regulations in that the former represented a total ban on price
advertising rather than certain restrictions on the type of advertising allowed.
The Court was careful to note a distinction between "complete speech bans"
and "content-neutral restrictions on time, place, or manner of expression. "261
Also, the Rhode Island statute was not expressly designed for the protection of
children. Nonetheless, Liquormart casts doubt on what otherwise might seem
a foregone conclusion: that the Court would find a legitimate substantial
governmental interest in the FDA's regulations.2"
3. The Regulations Must Directly Advance the Governmental Interest
If the government demonstrates a substantial interest, then the Central
Hudson test requires the government to demonstrate a connection between the
proposed restrictions and its substantial interest.267 In United States v. Edge
Broadcasting Co.,2 6 the Court clarified the standard, holding that the
government must show "an immediate connection between advertising and
demand."269 Although the test may appear strict, courts have until recently
been relaxed in their interpretation of a direct link and have generally
supported the link between advertising and consumption. The very fact that
advertisers oppose advertising restrictions so vehemently has itself been seen
as proof of this connection. As the Court stated in Central Hudson, "[t]here is
an immediate connection between advertising and demand for electricity.
263. Id. at 1508 (quoting Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 n.9) (citation omitted).
264. Id. at 1508.
265. Id. at 1507.
266. Liquormart also laid to rest the idea that the Court favors governmental regulation of
advertising when the advertising relates to a "vice" activity. Four Justices joined in agreeing that "a
'vice' label that is unaccompanied by a corresponding prohibition against the commercial behavior at
issue fails to provide a principled justification for the regulation of commercial speech about that
activity." Id. at 1513-14.
267. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 556.
268. 509 U.S. 418 (1993).
269. Id. at 434.
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Central Hudson would not contest the advertising ban unless it believed that
promotion would increase its sales."270
In Penn I and Penn II, the District Court of Maryland supported the
proposition that advertising leads to increased consumption. The court in Penn
II found such a link in examining a question identical to that posed by the
FDA's proposed regulations. By corollary, the court reasoned that if
advertising increases the consumption of cigarettes, then a decrease in
advertising would lead to a decrease in cigarette consumption.27' The
counterargument, as advanced by Penn Advertising, is that the purpose of
advertising is not to increase overall consumption but to increase the market
share of a particular brand. However, the court rejected this counterargument,
stating:
It is beyond our ability to understand why huge sums of money would be devoted
to the promotion of sales of liquor without expected results, or continue without
realized results. No doubt competitors want to retain and expand their share of the
market, but what business person stops short with competitive comparisons? It is
total sales, profits, that pay the advertiser; and dollars go into advertising only if
they produce sales. Money talks: it alks to the young and the old about what counts
in the marketplace of our society.272
The link between advertising and consumption is all the more convincing
when the audience includes minors. The Court in Penn I1 noted that "if
advertising increases consumption among the general population, it is also
reasonable to accept the proposition that advertising increases consumption
among youths. If anything, this statement may be more applicable to the
youthful population than to the adult population due to the impressionable
nature of youngsters."273
With reference to the "judicially recognized proposition that advertising
increases consumption,"274 however, Liquormart again threatens to change
the settled landscape. Far from accepting the relationship between advertising
and demand as a reasonable given, the Court determined that the government
must meet a high burden of proof to support such a claim in any given
instance. The Court stated that "[a]lthough the record suggests that the price
advertising ban may have some input on the purchasing patterns of temperate
drinkers of modest means, the State has presented no evidence to suggest that
270. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 569.
271. See Penn I1, 862 F. Supp. at 1410. Similarly, the Supreme Court in Posadas agreed with the
Puerto Rico Legislature that advertising of casino gambling would increase the demand for gambling.
See 478 U.S. at 341-42.
272. Penn 11, 862 F. Supp. at 1410 (quoting Penn 1, 855 F.Supp. at 818).
273. Id. at 1410.
274. Id.
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its speech prohibition will significantly reduce market-wide consumption." 25
The Court continued:
[A]ny conclusion that elimination of the ban would significantly increase alcohol
consumption would require us to engage in the sort of 'speculation or conjecture'
that is an unacceptable means of demonstrating that a restriction on commercial
speech directly advances the State's asserted interests . . . . Such speculation
certainly does not suffice when the State takes aim at accurate commercial
information for paternalistic ends.2 7
6
The need to present empirical proof is not necessarily fatal to the FDNs
case. However, it may mean that the FDA will have to rethink its approach to
the proof issue. The FDA has argued that:
[I]t is not necessary for [the] FDA to establish by empirical evidence that
advertising actually causes underage individuals to smoke, or that the restrictions
on advertising will directly result in individuals that are under 18 ceasing to use
cigarettes or smokeless tobacco. . . . Rather, the agency must show that the
available evidence, expert opinion, surveys and studies, provide sufficient support
for the influence that advertising does play a material role in children's tobacco
use.
21n
If the Court does require a higher level of proof than this, as Liquormart
suggests it will, the government may have a difficult time proving that tobacco
advertising causes teens to smoke. The FDA cites studies of foreign countries
that have restricted some forms of tobacco advertising and promotion in
support of its argument on the relationship between advertising restrictions and
reduced consumption.2 7' However, a study by the International Advertising
Association examined eight communist countries where cigarette advertising
had been banned for more than thirty years in each country. The evidence
suggested that advertising bans had failed to achieve the effect that their
proponents had hoped. "In all eight centrally planned economies per capita
cigarette consumption grew from 1970 to 1981 by an average of 14%, and
aggregate consumption increased by 25% ."279
Tobacco companies present alternative theories, both for what their
advertising achieves, if not increased consumption, and for what other factors
correlate with increased consumption. They argue that cigarette advertising
does not increase overall consumption but merely serves to distinguish brands
275. Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1509.
276. Id. at 1510.
277. Rule, 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,474.
278. Id. at 44, 490-92.
279. R?OBERT D. TOLLISON & RICHARD E. WAGNER, THE ECONOMICS OF SMOKING 151 (1992).
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from each other and to encourage brand switching.' They also argue that
the single best predictor of whether a young person will smoke seems to be
whether that young person has a best friend who smokesst rather than how
much exposure to advertising the young person has.
The FDA responds that while tobacco advertising is not the only factor that
causes individuals to smoke, it does affect other smoking influences, such as
peer group and social pressures. "To argue that smoking is influenced by peer
pressures at school begs the questions of where such pressures originate and
who will benefit from them." 2" The FDA continues that while "advertising
may not be the most important factor in a child's decision to smoke[,] . . . it
is a substantial, contributing, and therefore material factor."" The govern-
ment relies substantially upon studies that, taken cumulatively, tend to
demonstrate the influence of cigarette advertising on young people. However,
the FDA concedes that none of the studies is individually sufficient to "(1)
Establish that advertising has an effect of directly causing minors to use
tobacco products; (2) determine directionality-that is, did advertising causes
the observed effect, or are smokers more observant of advertising ...; or (3)
define terms or disprove the influence of peer pressure in smoking behav-
ior. "21 Without such conclusive evidence, Liquormart suggests, the govern-
ment could conceivably fail at this prong of Central Hudson.
4. The Regulations Must Be Narrowly Tailored
(a.) The meaning of the requirement. The final prong of the Central Hudson
test requires that restrictions on commercial speech be narrowly tailored to
meet the government's interest. While the requirement of narrow tailoring in
the context of political speech implies that there be no less restrictive
alternative,' the requirement has been interpreted somewhat differently in
the context of commercial speech.
In Board of Trustees v. Fox,2 6 the Court clarified the narrow tailoring
test in Central Hudson:
280. See Rule, 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,489 (noting tobacco industry comments claiming that because
"advertising is . . .directed ... to adults who already use tobacco .... it is not proper subject for
government regulation."). Critics point out that "It is curious that the only two categories of advertising
that the [advertising] industry suggests do not increase consumption are also those threatened by legisla-
tion"-tobacco and alcohol. TOLLISON & WAGNER, supra note ?, at 148.
281. See PHILIP J. HILTS, SMOKESCREEN: THE TRUTH BEHIND THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY COVER-UP
77 (1996).
282. CHAPMAN, supra note 236, at 8.
283. Rule, 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,476.
284. Id.
285. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (narrow tailoring requires that the
restriction on speech "is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of [the government's] interest.").
286. 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
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What our decisions require is a "fit between the legislature's ends and the means
chosen to accomplish those ends,"-a fit that is not necessarily perfect, but
reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single best disposition but one whose
scope is in proportion to the interest served; that employs not necessarily the least
restrictive means but, ... a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired
objective. Within these bounds we leave it to governmental decisionmakers to judge
what manner of regulation may best be employed.2
"Reasonable fit" does not require that there exist no other regulatory
options. In Penn II, the court determined that the restrictions on cigarette
advertising were a sufficiently reasonable fit despite the existence of alternative
means:
The mere suggestion of alternatives ... does not conclusively establish that the
City's chosen means are not narrowly tailored; a reasonable fit is all that is
necessary: 'A judge need not agree with the decisionmaker as to the most
appropriate method for promoting a governmental interest; as long as there is a
reasonable fit between the restriction and the interest served, the manner of
regulation is left to the decisionmaker.' In other words, although consideration of
alternatives is an element of 'reasonable fit,' it is not dispositive.3
However, whether a set of restrictions is a "reasonable fit" may be
conditional on whether or not the restrictions allow for alternative means of
expression. As the Court stated in Liquormart, "[i]f alternative channels permit
communication of the restricted speech, the regulation is more likely to be
considered reasonable." 28 9
Previously, the government has argued that if it has the authority to
prohibit an activity, it also has the authority to take the lesser step of restricting
advertising of that activity. The majority in Posadas found it strange to
"concede to the legislature the authority to totally ban a product or activity, but
to deny to the legislature the authority to forbid the stimulation of demand for
the product or activity through advertising on behalf of those who would profit
from such increased demand."2" In Liquormart, however, the Court rejected
the "greater-includes-the-lesser" argument it had previously endorsed in
Posadas. The Liquorinart Court reasoned that "banning speech may sometimes
prove far more intrusive than banning conduct .... [W]e reject the assumption
that words are necessarily less vital to freedom than actions, or that logic
somehow proves that the power to prohibit an activity is necessarily 'greater'
than the power to suppress speech about it."291 Whether the government can
287. Id. (quoting Posadas, 478 U.S. at 341).
288. Penn I, 862 F. Supp. at 1414 (quoting Penn 1, 855 F. Supp. at 819).
289. Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1521.
290. Posadas, 478 U.S. at 346.
291. Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1512.
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prohibit tobacco consumption, therefore, has no bearing on the application of
the reasonable fit test.
(b.) Are the FDA's proposed restrictions a reasonable fit? One reason
tobacco supporters believe that the proposed restrictions may be an unreason-
able fit is that the restrictions will significantly affect adults as well as children.
The regulations may:
(1) [s]ubstantially impair advertising of tobacco to adults; (2) deprive adults of
useful information about products and services such as availability, price, and
quality; (3) reduce the incentive and ability to market improved products; and (4)
deprive adult smokers of the benefits of competition to provide a broad range of
choice and to assure that tobacco products are provided at the lowest possible
cost.
292
Opponents of the regulations point out that "[t]obacco advertising in magazines
is already low and has fallen drastically during the last decade. By restricting
tobacco advertising in publications that have a fifteen percent or more youth
readership, the government is effectively restricting the up to eighty-five
percent adult readers of those magazines from receiving the information."293
A similar issue arises in obscenity and indecency law, and its treatment
there can provide some insight. The Court has granted obscenity and indecency
a low level of speech protection. Nonetheless, in Butler v. Michigan,2" the
Court found that the effect of Michigan's obscene literature statute was to
"reduce the adult population of Michigan to reading only what is fit for
children. It thereby arbitrarily curtails one of those liberties of the individual,
now enshrined in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, that
history has attested as the indispensable conditions for the maintenance and
progress of a free society."295 Yet, in Federal Communications Commission
v. Pacifica Foundation,295 when ruling on a prohibition of "indecent"
material during certain hours on radio broadcasts, the Court found that the
incidental effects on adults were justifiable." The Court based its conclusion
on the access concerns that were inherent to broadcasting.2 9 The Court's
holding was thus very narrow, and required any restrictions to take into
account many variables, including the time of day and the anticipated audience.
Nevertheless, the Pacifica holding stands for the Court's willingness to tolerate
a certain amount of carefully controlled intrusion into adult-accessible speech
292. Rule, 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,468 (summarizing commentary of regulations' opponents).
293. Ludwikowski, supra note 201, at 115.
294. 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
295. Id. at 383-84. The Court in Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC., 492 U.S. 115 (1989),
followed the reasoning of the Butler Court in striking down provisions in which the rights of adults were
limited to what was acceptable for children.
296. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
297. Id. at 750.
298. See id.
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in order to protect children when particularly accessible forms of media are
involved.
In Penn II, the district court's ruling paralleled Pacifica in that respect. The
court noted the pervasive and uncontrollable nature of billboards in the
community; consequently, the court supported the City's reasoning in
differentiating between billboards and other media forms. "[T]here is a
legitimate justification relating to the City's asserted interest for differentiating
billboards from other types of media which are less accessible to children and
to which parents can control their children's exposure, media such as
newspapers, magazines and signs inside stores which sell cigarettes."'
Whether the Court would find that the FDA's restrictions deal sufficiently
narrowly with special, highly youth-accessible media is a key question. The
answer could well be different for different regulations, e.g., billboards
surrounding school areas (to which parents might have great difficulty in
restricting a child's "access") versus distribution of promotional items (which
parents may be more able to monitor effectively.). Moreover, the Court could
avoid reaching that inquiry if it determined that the FDA's goals could be
reached more effectively by means that were clearly less restrictive of speech.
While "reasonable fit" leaves some room for alternative solutions to go
untried,3" a restriction of commercial speech cannot survive if "[i]t is
perfectly obvious that alternative forms of regulation that would not involve
any restriction on speech would be more likely to achieve the State's goal .
"01 If the Court believed that government counterspeech, for example,
would be equally or more effective in negating the harm done by advertising,
the FDA's regulations would stand little chance.
E. Conclusion
Our Central Hudson analysis of the FDA's tobacco advertising regulations
reveals above all the complexity and malleability of the test itself. There are
several points within each prong of the test on which either the FDA or the
tobacco industry could legitimately prevail. Under the misleading/deceptive
prong, the FDA can point to the concealment of nicotine's effects; the tobacco
industry can reasonably question whether the public has, in fact, received the
wrong idea. Under the substantial interest prong, the FDA can rely on the
time-tested governmental interest in children's welfare; the tobacco industry,
however, can invoke the specter of government policy masquerading as
consumer protection. Under the prong that examines whether the FD~s
methods would further its interest, the FDA can summon general empirical
299. Penn II, 862 F. Supp. at 1412.
300. See supra text accompanying note 288.
301. Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1510.
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evidence as well as common sense; the tobacco industry can demand a higher
level of empirical proof, as per Liquormart. And under the narrow tailoring
prong, the field is wide open for debate as to the particular methods that the
FDA has chosen.
Given the ambiguities inherent in the test and the compelling arguments that
can be made on both sides, the mood of the Court may become the determining
factor. If the recent decision in Liquormart augurs a permanent shift-a
hypothesis at best, since no part of the decision garnered a clear majority-the
FDA faces an uphill battle. Only one outcome of a Supreme Court analysis of
the FDA's regulations can be predicted with certainty: Whatever decision the
Court might embrace will have permanent implications, not just for the
American tobacco industry, but for First Amendment jurisprudence itself.
- Melvin T Davis
